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O

INTRODUCTION

VER twenty years after its birth, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.' shows no sign of losing its influence. On the contrary,
the decision has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional
text-the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative
agencies. Ironically, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, had no
broad ambitions for the decision; the Court did not mean to do
anything dramatic.2 But shortly after it appeared, Chevron was
'467 U.S. 837. As a sign of Chevron's influence, consider the fact that the decision
was cited 2414 times in its first decade (between 1984 and January 1, 1994), 2584 times
in its next six years (between January 1, 1994 and January 1, 2000), and 2235 times in
its next five years (between January 1, 2000 and January 28, 2005). LEXIS search,
Mar. 2005.
2 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law
in the Supreme Court: Highlights
From the Marshall Papers, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 10606, 10613 (1993). In fact it is possible,
and fascinating, to trace a series of opinions in which Justice Stevens expressed reservations about the broad reading of Chevron and attempted to domesticate the decision. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 703-08 (1995); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-48 (1987); Young v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 985 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Chris-
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quickly taken to establish a new approach to judicial review of
agency interpretations of law,3 going so far as to create a kind of
counter-Marbury for the administrative state. Chevron seemed to
declare that in the face of ambiguity, it is emphatically the province
is.4
and duty of the administrativedepartment to say what the law
Chevron also appeared to have imperialistic aspirations, cutting
across countless areas of substantive law and the full range of procedures by which agencies might interpret statutory law. Some of
those ambitions have been realized, for Chevron has had a fundalaborregulation,
law,' envi-9
taxation,'
as disparate 8 asfood
on areas
impact
mental
7 immigration,
and drug
protection,
ronmental

tensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 595 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (endorsin "fully" Justice Breyer's narrow reading of Chevron).
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 301, 301-03 (1988);
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283,
283-84 (1986). On the real-world consequences of Chevron, see Peter H. Schuck & E.
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984, 1020-61. Schuck and Elliott find a significant effect
from Chevron: an increase in affirmance rates from seventy-one percent in the preChevron year of 1984 to eighty-one percent in the post-Chevron year of 1985. Id. at
1030. Over more extended periods, studies are hard to conduct, because prospective
litigants adjust their mix of cases to the rules governing judicial review of agency action; when challenges are hard to sustain under doctrines of deference, fewer challenges will be brought. At the same time, agencies and their lawyers are likely to adjust their own practices to deference doctrines as well, and take legal risks that they
would not assume if courts were less likely to defer. Relevant findings, exploring the
importance of whether a panel is composed of Republican or Democratic appointees
to the application of Chevron, can be found in Thomas Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with Virginia Law Review) (finding
significant effects of party affiliation on judicial voting in Chevron cases); see also
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155,
2168-76 (1998) (finding that unified Republican panels were less likely to follow
Chevron where the agency decision aligned with judicial political policy preferences).
'Contra Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
'E.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 383-87 (1998); Tate & Lyle, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996).
6 E.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987);
Cavert Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 1996).
7 E.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
'E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
'E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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and highway safety." In all of these areas, and many more, Chevron
has signaled a substantial increase in agency discretion to make
policy through statutory interpretation. For this reason, Chevron
might well be seen not only as a kind of counter-Marbury,but even
more fundamentally as the administrative state's very own
McCulloch v. Maryland,Ix permitting agencies to do as they wish so
long as there is a reasonable connection between their choices and
congressional instructions. This grant of permission seemed to depend on a distinctive account of legal interpretation, one that sees
resolution of statutory ambiguity as involving judgments of principle and policy and insists that the executive, not the courts, should
make those judgments. 2
In the last fifteen years, however, the simplest interpretations of
Chevron have unraveled. Like a novel or even a poem, the decision
has inspired fresh and occasionally even shocking readings. In
some cases, the Court appears to have moved strongly in the direction of pre-Chevron law, in an evident attempt to reassert the primacy of the judiciary in statutory interpretation. At times, the effort to re-establish judicial supremacy has been quite explicit." But
the result has not been a restoration of pre-Chevron principles; it
has instead been the addition of several epicycles to the Chevron
framework, producing not only a decrease in agency authority, but
also a significant increase in uncertainty about the appropriate approach. More than at any time in recent years, a threshold question-the scope of judicial review-has become one of the most
vexing in regulatory cases."
Chevron famously creates a two-step inquiry for courts to follow
in reviewing agency interpretations of law." The first step asks
whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue," an inquiry that requires an assessment of whether Con-

0E.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
13 E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26, 161
(2000); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708
(1995); Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 446-49.
14
detailed discussion can be found in Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005).
" 467 U.S. at 842-44.
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gress's intent is "clear" and "unambiguously expressed." 6 The second step asks whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible,"
which is to say reasonable in light of the underlying law.17 It is an
understatement to say that a great deal of judicial and academic attention has been paid to the foundations and meaning of Chevron's
two-step inquiry. 8 But in the last period, the most important and
confusing questions have involved neither step. Instead they involve Chevron Step Zero-the initial inquiry into whether the
Chevron framework applies at all. 9 The Supreme Court has issued
several important Step Zero decisions,' which clarify a number of
questions but also offer complex and conflicting guidance. As we
shall see, the entire area is pervaded by legal fictions about congressional understandings, and the proliferation of fictions has vindicated the fears of those who have insisted on the importance of a
simple answer to the Step Zero question.21
My principal purpose in this Article is to provide an understanding of the foundations and nature of the Step Zero dilemma and to
suggest how that dilemma should be resolved. I shall argue that the
Step Zero inquiry has become far too unruly and that the doctrine
should be simplified in a way that will broaden the application of
the Chevron framework. Many cases can be decided without resolving the Step Zero question; in such cases, it will not matter
whether Chevron deference is applied. If Step Zero questions must
16Id. at

842-43.

at 843.
See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255 (1988); Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas
W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351
(1994); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 301 (1988); Starr, supra note
3; Note, "How Clear is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687 (2005).
191 gratefully borrow the term, and hence my title, from Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 836 (2001). For a recent illustration of the importance of the Step Zero inquiry, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct.
904 (2006) (holding that an interpretive ruling by the Attorney General is not entitled
to Chevron deference because there is no general grant of rulemaking authority to the
Attorney General).
20
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
21 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 245-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Adrian Vermeule,
Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 347-49, 358-61 (2003).
'7Id.

8
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be answered, courts should increase their willingness to use the
Chevron framework whenever the agency has authoritatively answered a question about the meaning of a statute that it has been
asked to implement.
As we shall see, Step Zero has become the central location of an
intense and longstanding disagreement between the Court's two
administrative law specialists, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia.22 In fact, it is impossible to understand the current debates without reference to this disagreement. In the 1980s, the two
converged, apparently independently, on a distinctive understanding of Chevron, one that roots the decision in a theory of implicit
congressional delegation of law-interpreting power to administrative agencies.' Both Justices explicitly recognized that any understanding of legislative instructions is a "legal fiction";24 both approved of resort to that fiction. But the two sharply disagreed
about its meaning and application. Here, as elsewhere, Justice
Scalia seeks clear and simple rules, intended to reduce the burdens
of decisionmaking for lower courts and litigants.2 5 And here, as
elsewhere, Justice Breyer prefers a case-by-case approach, one that
eschews simplicity in the interest of (what he sees as) accuracy. 6
This kind of disagreement, involving a classic rules-standards debate," echoes throughout the law, but as we shall see, it has distinctive resonance in the context of judicial review of agency interpretations of law.
22

Justice Breyer taught administrative law for many years at Harvard Law School;

Justice Scalia did the same at the University of Virginia School of Law and the University of Chicago Law School.
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.
Rev. 363, 370-82 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 516-17.
24
Breyer, supra note 23, at 370; Scalia, supra note 23, at 517. This point is emphasized and explored in David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212-25 (2002).
2 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175
26 (1989).
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 848-61 (1992) (arguing for use of legislative history in
statutory construction and against the simplicity of textualism).
27 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Duke
L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992).
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On an important matter, Justice Scalia's approach has largely triumphed, at least thus far: When agency decisions have the force of
law or follow a formal procedure, Chevron continues to supply a
simple rule, notwithstanding early efforts to cabin its reach.' In recent years, however, Justice Breyer's approach has enjoyed a partial but significant victory, on the theory that Chevron should not
be taken to cede law-interpreting power to agencies in circumstances in which it is implausible to infer a congressional delegation
of such power. A trilogy of cases, unambiguously directed to Step
Zero, has suggested that when agencies have not exercised delegated power to act with the force of law, a case-by-case analysis of
several factors ought to be used to determine whether Chevron
provides the governing framework.29 In a separate trilogy of cases,
which I will call the "Major Question" trilogy,' the Court has
raised a separate Step Zero question by suggesting the possibility
that deference will be reduced, or even nonexistent, if a fundamental issue is involved, one that goes to the heart of the regulatory
scheme at issue. The apparent theory is that Congress should not
be taken to have asked agencies to resolve those issues.
I suggest that both trilogies point in unfortunate directions because they increase uncertainty and judicial policymaking without
promoting important countervailing values. As for the first: The
"force of law" test is a crude way of determining whether Chevron
deference is appropriate, and it introduces far too much complexity
into the deference issue. As we shall see, the Court is apparently
seeking to allow Chevron deference only, or mostly, when agency
decisions have followed procedures that guarantee deliberation
and reflectiveness. But that goal, however appealing, cannot justify
the high level of complexity and confusion that the first trilogy has
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-48 (1987). As we shall see, this
claim must be qualified by reference to recent developments involving major questions. See infra notes 209-49 and accompanying text. Moreover, Justice Breyer has
argued that the simple rule does not, in fact, reflect the law. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2713 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
29
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 221, 226-34 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88
(2000).
30
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33, 159-61 (2000);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703-08
(1995); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228-34 (1994).
28See
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introduced into the threshold question whether Chevron applies at
all.
As for the second: There should not be an exception to the
Chevron framework for those agency decisions that have "large" or
fundamental policy implications. Major questions are not easily
distinguished from less major ones, and the considerations that underlie Chevron apply with more, not less, force when major questions are involved. To be sure, it is possible to defend a background
principle that limits agency discretion when constitutionally sensitive interests are at stake.31 But that principle should not be converted into a general presumption in favor of limiting agency authority-a presumption that would encode a kind of status quo
bias, or possibly even a strong antiregulatory "tilt," into the Chevron framework.
My argument, in short, is that where possible, the Step Zero question should be resolved in favor of applying the standard Chevron
framework-a framework that has the dual advantages of simplifying the operation of regulatory law and giving policymaking authority to institutions that are likely to have the virtues of specialized
competence and political accountability. 2 The Court's emerging
steps in favor of a more complex framework, calling for independent
judicial judgment in certain circumstances, are a product of an evident desire to constrain agency discretion when such discretion
seems particularly unlikely to be fairly exercised.3 But the Court's
goals can be accomplished in much simpler and better ways-above
all, by insisting both on the rule of law constraints embodied in Steps
One and Two and on continued judicial review for arbitrariness.

"' See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663,
2664 (2005).
32 Unfortunately, empirical analysis shows that even under Chevron, judicial policy
preferences are continuing to play a significant role in judicial review of agency interpretations of law. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3. For example, Republican appointees are more sympathetic to interpretations by Republican presidents than to
those by Democratic presidents, and Democratic appointees show the opposite preference. See id. In addition, former Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, have shown significantly greater deference to agency interpretations of law
after President Bush succeeded President Clinton-while Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer have shown significantly decreased deference after that succession. Id. These findings might well be taken to support a strong reading of Chevron,
one that disciplines judicial policymaking. See id.
" See Bressman, supra note 14.
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This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will explore the
early debates over Chevron, with particular emphasis on the striking contrast between then-Judge Breyer's effort to domesticate the
decision by reading it to permit case-by-case inquiries and Justice
Scalia's insistence that Chevron is a dramatic development that establishes an across-the-board presumption. Part II will investigate
the first Step Zero trilogy, in which the Court has held that Chevron applies to agency decisions having the force of law or backed
by relatively formal procedures, while requiring a case-by-case inquiry into whether Chevron applies to less formal agency action. I
will contend here that the Court has opted for an excessively complex approach; greater simplicity would be far preferable. Part III
will explore the Major Question trilogy, in which the Court has
also failed to apply Chevron in the ordinary way, apparently on the
theory that certain questions, involving the basic reach of regulatory statutes, are for courts rather than agencies. In this Part, I will
argue that such questions should be analyzed under the standard
framework of Steps One and Two.
I. CHEVRON IN THE 1980s: FOUNDATIONS AND REACH

A. Chevron's Framing: Two Steps in Search of a Rationale
4
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
the Court announced its two-step approach without giving a clear
sense of the theory that justified it. The case itself involved the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to define
"stationary source" under the nonattainment provisions of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") as an entire plant, rather than as each pollution-emitting unit within the plant.35 The Supreme Court insisted
that because the statute was ambiguous, the EPA could supply
whatever reasonable definition it chose.
But why, exactly, should agencies be permitted to interpret
statutory ambiguities as they see fit, subject only to the limitations
of reasonableness? The Court emphasized that Congress sometimes explicitly delegates law-interpreting power to agencies;36 if
the CAA had said "stationary source (as defined by the Adminis467 U.S.837.
3'Id. at 840 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)).
36467 U.S. at 843-44.
14
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trator)," judges would have to accept the agency's judgment. The
CAA, of course, contained no explicit delegation, but the Court
added that "[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit."37 If so, a court
must still accept any reasonable agency interpretation.
But this conclusion raises a further question: Why should a court
find an implicit delegation in the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") or the CAA, which supplied the governing statutory provisions in Chevron itself? The APA does not appear to delegate
law-interpreting power to agencies; on the contrary, it specifies that
the "reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
[and] interpret... statutory provisions."38 This phrase seems to
suggest that ambiguities must be resolved by courts and hence that
the Chevron framework is wrong. But by empowering the EPA to
issue regulations, perhaps the CAA is best taken to say that the
agency is implicitly entrusted with the interpretation of statutory
terms. If so, the reviewing court must continue to follow the APA
and decide "all relevant questions of law," but the answer to the
relevant questions will depend on the EPA's interpretation, because under the CAA, the law is what the EPA says it is." In Chevron, the Court referred to this possibility, noting that Congress
might have wanted the agency to answer the underlying questions
with the belief "that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position [than Congress itself] to do so."' But the Court did not insist that Congress in fact had such an intention. On the1 contrary, it
said that Congress's particular intention "matters not.'
Instead, the Court briefly emphasized judges' lack of expertise
and, in more detail, their lack of electoral legitimacy. In interpreting laws, an agency may "properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Ex37

Id. at 844.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 25-28 (1983) (arguing that courts can defer to agency interpretations of law
when, under statute, the law is what the agency says it is).
0 467 U.S. at 865.
41 Id.
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ecutive is ....,2 Hence it would be appropriate for agencies, rather
than judges, to resolve "competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or43intentionally left to be resolved ...in light of everyday realities.
The Chevron Court's approach was much clearer than the rationale that accounted for it. The Court's reference to expertise
suggested one possible rationale: Perhaps the Court was saying
that the resolution of statutory ambiguities sometimes calls for
technical expertise, and in such cases deference would be appropriate. On this view, which has roots in the New Deal's enthusiasm
for technical competence, ' specialized administrators, rather than
judges, should make the judgments of policy that are realistically at
stake in disputes over ambiguous terms. But the Court's emphasis
on accountability suggested a second possibility: Perhaps the twostep inquiry is based on a healthy recognition that in the face of
ambiguity, agency decisions must rest on judgments of value, and
those judgments should be made by political rather than judicial
institutions. On this view, which has roots in legal realism, 5 value
choices are a significant part of statutory construction, and those
choices should be made by democratically accountable officials.
This reading suggests a third and more ambitious possibility: Perhaps Chevron is rooted in the separation of powers, requiring
courts to accept executive interpretations of statutory ambiguities
in order to guard against judicial displacement of political judgments. 46
In the 1980s, then-Judge Breyer" and Justice Scalia, both administrative law specialists, rejected all of these readings of Chevron.
42

Id.

41Id.

at 865-66.
" See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 23-26 (1938). The point is connected to Chevron in Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to
Interpret the Law, 115 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
41 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931) (emphasizing the role of value judgments in legal
reasoning). On realism and Chevron, see Sunstein, supra note 44. For empirical evidence, showing that judicial review of agency interpretations of law is affected by the
political inclinations of federal judges, see Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3.
,6See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin. L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988).
47For ease of exposition, I shall henceforth refer to "Judge
Breyer" when discussing
his 1986 essay. Breyer, supra note 23.
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They agreed that Chevron must rest on a simple idea: Courts defer
to agency interpretationsof law when, and because, Congress has
told them to do so. As we shall see, this reading of Chevron has
prevailed. It follows that if Congress sought to entrench Chevron, it
could do so by providing that statutory ambiguities must be resolved by agencies; and if Congress sought to overrule Chevron by
calling for independent judicial judgments about legal questions, it
could do precisely that. Judge Breyer and Justice Scalia agreed that
the national legislature retains control of the deference question,
and in this sense, Chevron must rest on an understanding of what
Congress has instructed courts to do. But their shared emphasis on
implicit delegation led Judge Breyer and Justice Scalia to quite different understandings of Chevron's scope and limitations. Whereas
Judge Breyer sought to domesticate Chevron, treating it as a kind
of "problem" to be solved by reference to previously established
principles, Justice Scalia saw Chevron as a genuinely revolutionary
decision-one that would fundamentally alter the relationship between agencies and reviewing courts and renovate what had long
been the law.
B. Against "Any Simple GeneralFormula":
Judge Breyer's Pleafor Complexity
In 1984, the same year Chevron was decided, Judge Breyer, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
tried to make sense of the Court's decision.48 His explanation of
Chevron pointed to a delegation of law-interpreting authority to
agencies. When Congress has not made an express delegation,
Judge Breyer wrote, "courts may still infer from the particular
statutory circumstances an implicit congressional instruction about
the degree of respect or deference they owe the agency on a question of law."49 The inference would be intensely particularistic; it
would rest on an inquiry into "what a sensible legislator would
have expected given the statutory circumstances."5 The expectations of the sensible legislator would depend on a judgment about
institutional competence:
,8Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
" Id.
'0Id.
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The less important the question of law, the more interstitial its
character, the more closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather than the court's)
administrative or substantive expertise, the less likely it is that
Congress (would have) "wished" or "expected" the courts to remain indifferent to the agency's views. Conversely, the larger the
question, the more its answer is likely to clarify or stabilize a
broad area of law, the more likely Congress intended the courts
to decide the question themselves. 1
Thus Judge Breyer's approach squarely endorsed the implicit
delegation theory, but in a way that required a case-by-case inquiry
into what "a sensible legislator would have expected given the
statutory circumstances." With an interstitial question closely connected to "the everyday administration of law" or calling for
agency expertise, deference would be warranted. But with a "larger" question, one whose answer would "stabilize a broad area of
law," an independent judicial assessment would be required.
Judge Breyer explored these issues far more systematically in a
1986 essay that has proven extremely, and indeed increasingly, influential.52 Judge Breyer's basic claim was straightforward. In the
immediate aftermath of Chevron, existing doctrine seemed to argue for deferential judicial review of agency interpretations of law
but stringent judicial review of agency judgments about policy. 3 In
this sense, the then-governing standards were "anomalous" because a rational system would call for "stricter review of matters of
law, where courts are more expert, but more lenient review of matters of policy, where agencies are more expert."54 In Judge Breyer's
view, judicial review should be specifically tailored to the "institutional capacities and strengths" of the judiciary.5 For that endeavor, the simple approach set out in Chevron was hopelessly inadequate.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
' 2 Breyer, supra note 23. A similar analysis is briefly offered in Stephen Breyer, AcSI

tive Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 102-08 (2005) [hereinafter
Breyer, Active Liberty].
"' Breyer, supra note 23, at 364-65.
14 Id. at 364-65,
397.
51Id. at 398.
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Judge Breyer began by emphasizing that, before Chevron, courts
had been inconsistent on the question of judicial review of agency
interpretations of law, with competing strands of deference and independence. 6 In order to reconcile the conflict, Judge Breyer
noted that courts might defer to agencies either because agencies
have a "better understanding of congressional will"57 or because
Congress delegated (explicitly or implicitly) interpretive power to
agencies."8 Judge Breyer added, crucially, that the idea of a "legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function" is "a kind of
legal fiction."59 When courts find such an intent, they are really
imagining "what a hypothetically 'reasonable' legislator would
have wanted (given the statute's objective)" and "looking to practical facts surrounding the administration of a statutory scheme."'
In Judge Breyer's view, this imagining should lead to a case-bycase inquiry into Congress's hypothesized intentions. If the question calls for special expertise, the agency is best equipped to answer it correctly; hence an ordinary question of agency administration would call for deference.6 If, however, the question is "an
important one," an independent judicial approach is preferable.
"Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily administration."62 (That
sentence has proven especially important, as we shall soon see.)
Judge Breyer added that a court should "consider the extent to
which the answer to the legal question will clarify, illuminate or
stabilize a broad area of the law," and "whether the agency can be
trusted to give a properly balanced answer."63 Judge Breyer insisted
that the reconciliation of the apparently conflicting lines of cases
depends on inquiries of this sort.

56Id.

at 365-67.

5'Id. at 368.
s'Id. at 369.
9Id. at 370.
6' Id.
61Id.

" Id.; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.
Ct. 2688, 2713 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to independent judicial review of "unusually basic" questions); Breyer, Active Liberty, supra note 52, at 106-07.
63Breyer, supra note 23, at 371.
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At this stage, Judge Breyer was confronted with an obvious
question about the relationship between his views and the Court's
approach in Chevron. To answer that question, he embarked on a
new discussion with a revealing title: "The Problem of the Chevron
Case."' He noted that Chevron could be read as embodying "the
complex approach" that he endorsed; but it could also be seen "as
embodying a considerably simpler approach," one that accepts any
reasonable agency interpretation in the face of ambiguity.65 Not
surprisingly, Judge Breyer argued strenuously against that latter
approach. Notwithstanding "its attractive simplicity," he urged, the
broad reading could not survive "in the long run."'
Judge Breyer offered three reasons for this conclusion. The first
involved the sheer diversity of situations in which courts might be
asked to defer to agency interpretations. No simple formula could
fit so "many different types of circumstances, including different
statutes, different kinds of application, different substantive regulatory or administrative problems, and different legal postures."67
Second, and ironically, a simple rule would increase delay and
complexity. Under Chevron, courts will sometimes have to remand
a case to an agency to establish a reasonable interpretation; because judges are at least as likely to produce the correct interpretation, such Chevron remands could be "a waste of time."' Third, the
simple view "asks judges to develop a cast of mind that often is
psychologically difficult to maintain."6' 9 The reason is that after a
detailed examination of a legal question, it is difficult "to believe
both that the agency's interpretation is legally wrong, and that its
interpretation is reasonable."7
In the end, Judge Breyer concluded, "these factors will tend to
force a less univocal, less far-reaching interpretation of Chevron.... Inevitably,... we will find the courts actually following
more varied approaches" without adhering to any "single simple
judicial formula."7 Judge Breyer urged, in short, that Chevron
6'Id. at 372.
65

Id. at 373.

Id.
7Id.

66

Id. at 378.
at 379.
Id.
71Id. at 380-81.
69
70 Id.
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should be read in accordance with the most sensible understanding
of what had preceded it, which entailed a case-specific inquiry into
Congress's fictional instructions on the question of deference.72 Far
from being a revolution, or even a major departure, Chevron
should be taken to codify the best understanding of then-existing
law.
C. An "Across-the-BoardPresumption":Justice Scalia's Plea
Writing just three years later, Justice Scalia defended Chevron in
exactly the same terms as Judge Breyer (though without referring
to his essay).73 He began by insisting that the decision ultimately
rested on a reading of congressional instructions-and hence that
prominent justifications for the decision, pointing to agency expertise and separation of powers, were incorrect." Quoting a lower
court with approval, Justice Scalia said that the deference judgment must be "a function of Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular statutory scheme at issue., 75 For Justice
Scalia, as for Judge Breyer, the central issue was what Congress has
told courts to do, for the national legislature maintains ultimate authority over the deference question.
Justice Scalia also agreed with Judge Breyer's reading of preChevron law. The lower courts had tried to decide the deference
question on a case-by-case basis, producing a recipe for confusion.
"Chevron, however, if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-bystatute evaluation (which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and
litigation) with an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of
ambiguity, agency discretion is meant., 76 Here again Justice Scalia
is in complete accord with Judge Breyer. But where Judge Breyer
challenges the presumption as unacceptably simplistic, Justice
72Candor

compels an acknowledgement that an extremely young man, writing in

the same period, analyzed the Chevron issue in terms akin to those used by Judge
Breyer. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 421, 465-70 (1987). A somewhat less young man believes that this conclusion,
favoring case-by-case inquiries into the deference question, was mistaken.
71Scalia, supra note 23.
14 Id. at 514-16.
15Id. at 516 (quoting Process Gas Consumers Group v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., 694
F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Constance v. Sec'y of Health &
Human
Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982))).
76

Id.
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Scalia defends it on exactly that ground-and hence as a dramatic
departure from what preceded it.
How might that presumption be defended? Returning to the
touchstone of legislative instructions, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that Chevron is "not a 100% accurate estimation of modern congressional intent";77 deference does not always capture what Congress wants. But "the prior case-by-case evaluation was not so either"" 8-a point that might be buttressed with the suggestion that
such evaluations will increase the burdens of decision while also
producing a degree of error from inevitably fallible judges. In the
end, Justice Scalia agreed with Judge Breyer on yet another point:
Any account of congressional instructions reflects "merely a fictional, presumed intent."79 A judgment about that fictional and presumed intent, Justice Scalia seemed to say, should also be based on
a judgment about what would amount to a sensible instruction by a
sensible legislature.
What makes sense, however, should be informed by a central
point: Any fictional or presumed intent will operate "principally as
a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate."''
By emphasizing this point, Justice Scalia marked his crucial departure from Judge Breyer. If we are speaking of fictional intent, then
Chevron, taken to provide a simple background rule, "is unquestionably better than what preceded it," simply because "Congress
now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible
interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose
policy biases will ordinarily be known."8' Thus Justice Scalia offers
a dynamic rather than static understanding of Chevron. Where
Judge Breyer questions whether a simple (in his term, "univocal")
deference rule accurately reflects (fictive) congressional understandings, Justice Scalia focuses on the effects of any deference
rule on subsequent congressional activity-a focus that, in his view,
argues for clarity and simplicity.

"
78 Id. at 517.
79

Id.
Id.

" Id.
81Id.
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To this Justice Scalia added two points about the scope of Chevron. First, the emphasis on "real or presumed legislative intent to
confer discretion" should obliterate the old idea that longstanding
and consistent interpretations would receive more deference than
recent and inconsistent ones.82 Second, and more fundamentally,
Justice Scalia suggested the distinct possibility that under Chevron,
it would be necessary to revisit "the distinction among the various
manners in which the agency makes its legal views known." 3 Even
mere litigating positions might receive Chevron deference:
[I]f the matter at issue is one for which the agency has responsibility, if all requisite procedures have been complied with, and if
there is no doubt that the position urged has full and considered
approval of the agency head, it is far from self-evident that the
agency's views should be denied their accustomed force simply
because they are first presented in the prosecution of a lawsuit.'
At this point Justice Scalia offered a jurisprudential suggestion,
one that has turned out to be quite prescient. In his view, "there is
a fairly close correlation between" enthusiasm for Chevron and a
commitment to textualist methods of interpretation. 5 "One who
finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent
from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby
finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists."' 6 Those who reject plain meaning, and are
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find
agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader
range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt
and to which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with
which Chevron will require that judge to accept an interpretation
he thinks wrong is infinitely greater.87

2

Id.

83Id. at 519.

8Id.
85Id. at 521.
86Id.
7
Id. Note in this regard that, of the nine members of the Court, Justice Scalia, the
most enthusiastic defender, has been the least willing to accept agency interpretations
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Justice Scalia noticed that Chevron had not yet marked a revolution in the law, for "it will take some time to understand that those
concepts are no longer relevant, or no longer relevant in the same
way." But he added his belief that "in the long run Chevron will
endure and be given its full scope" simply because "it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately
serves its needs." 89
Whereas Judge Breyer predicted a disintegration of Chevron's
simple approach on the ground that it was ill-suited to a complex
reality, Justice Scalia contended that Chevron would be given its
full scope, and amount to a major and novel development, precisely because of its rule-based quality. As we shall see, Judge
Breyer's prediction appears to have proved to be more accurate,
but in important respects, the jury is still out.
It should be clear that the disagreement between Judge Breyer
and Justice Scalia involves the pervasive choice between standards
and rules. Judge Breyer urged that no rule could solve the deference problem, simply because it would produce intolerable inaccuracy. Justice Scalia can be taken to have responded that a rule is
likely to be as accurate as any standard and that it has the further
advantage of reducing decisional burdens on courts. Seeing a deference rule as relevant to Congress's subsequent performance, Justice Scalia emphasized, as Judge Breyer did not, that a simple rule
would provide better guidance to subsequent legislators. If the
choice between rules and standards turns in part on the costs of error and the costs of decisions,' then Judge Breyer and Justice
Scalia might be seen as disagreeing about exactly how to assess
those costs.
D. Reading Deference DoctrinesJurisprudentially:Chevron As Erie
If Chevron is read in light of the shared concerns of Judge
Breyer and Justice Scalia, it can be understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial to agency law-

of law! See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 3-4. By contrast, Justice Breyer, Chevron's strongest critic, has been the most willing to accept those interpretations. Id.
Scalia, supra note 23, at 521.
9
Id.
90See Kaplow, supra note 27, at 621-23.
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making.9" In numerous contexts, judge-made law has been replaced
by administrative regulation, often pursuant to vague or openended legislative guidance. The replacement has been spurred by
dual commitments to specialized competence and democratic accountability-and also by an understanding of the need for frequent shifts in policy over time, with fresh understandings of fact as
well as new values. For banking, telecommunications, national security, and environmental protection-among many other areaschanging circumstances often require agencies to adapt old provisions to unanticipated problems.
Despite the Court's lack of ambition for its decision, the Chevron framework, approving a bold and novel initiative by the
Reagan Administration, did speak explicitly of the role of expertise
and accountability in statutory interpretation. And if interpretation
of unclear terms cannot operate without some judgments by the interpreter, then the argument for Chevron, as the appropriate legal
fiction, seems overwhelming. Indeed, Chevron can be seen in this
light as a close analogue to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"-as a
suggestion that law and interpretation often involve no "brooding
omnipresence in the sky"93 but instead discretionary judgments to
be made by appropriate institutions. For resolution of statutory
ambiguities, no less than for identification of common law, federal
courts may not qualify as appropriate.
I am suggesting, then, that Justice Scalia's argument about the
need for a clear background rule can be strengthened with an emphasis on Judge Breyer's claims about expertise, an appreciation of
the pressing need for agency flexibility over time, and a recognition
that when agencies interpret ambiguities, a judgment of value is often involved.94 As we shall see, many of the post-Chevron cases,
read in context, testify to the importance of these points. But if
Chevron is read both broadly and ambitiously, it runs immediately
into Judge Breyer's objection that it is too crude and "univocal."
91An illuminating study is Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude
to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers' Compensation (2000). See also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 113-41 (1985), for a valuable discussion in the context of social security disability determinations.
9'304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
S.3Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9 See Sunstein, supra note 44, for a more elaborate treatment of these points.
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STEP ZERO

A. Possibilities
The disagreements between Justices Scalia and Breyer could
manifest themselves at multiple points. Suppose that the question
involves Chevron Step One. We should expect a degree of simplicity from Justice Scalia, in the form of deference to the agency's interpretation unless the text unambiguously forbids it; and that expectation is met in many cases.9' We might expect Justice Breyer to
be less willing to find statutory language to be plain and hence to
be willing to defer to agencies even when Justice Scalia is not; and
there is evidence to this effect as well.96

In these respects, the tempting idea that Justice Scalia's enthusiastically pro-Chevron approach will be more deferential to agencies is far too crude. If Justice Scalia is correct to say that Chevron
enthusiasts are also likely to insist on plain meaning, then those
who favor the "simple" reading of Chevron will be more likely to
resolve cases unfavorably to the agency at Step One, by finding
that the agency has violated the statutory language. There is some
evidence that this is true.'
In fact, the 1980s disagreement might have been expected to involve something far larger than Step Zero. While Justice Scalia
would adopt a general rule of deference to agency interpretations
when statutory language is ambiguous, Justice Breyer would call
for a case-by-case inquiry into (fictional, hypothesized) legislative
9'
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546-47 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that the EEOC's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 601-02 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of upholding the EEOC's
interpretation of the statute because it is reasonable, and the text does not "unambiguously require a different interpretation") (quoting United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714-18 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the statute's language was sufficiently clear as to make the agency's regulation
"necessarily unreasonable").
96See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that Justice
Breyer joined the majority opinion in Sweet Home, ruling that the statute permitted
the agency's interpretation. Id. at 688, 703-04. Note as well that in the actual application of the Chevron framework, Justice Breyer has been far more deferential than
Justice Scalia has been. See supra note 87.
' Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218,225-29 (1994); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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expectations. The major locus of the disagreement, however, has
become much narrower. It involves the threshold question whether
Chevron is applicable at all-a question ignored by Judge Breyer
in 1986 and prominently presaged by Justice Scalia in 1989. In
Chevron's first decade, this question was largely invisible; and a
number of decisions applied the Chevron framework without serious consideration of any Step Zero.
Consider, for example, Young v. Community Nutrition Institute.98
That case involved a provision mandating that "the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] shall promulgate regulations limiting
the quantity [of any poisonous or deleterious substance added to
any food] to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of
public health."' The interpretive question, one of considerable
practical importance, was whether "to such extent as he finds necessary" modified "shall promulgate," so as to allow the Secretary
not to act at all, or instead modified "limiting the quantity," so as
to require him to issue regulations, but with such severity as he
chose. The agency had settled on the former interpretation, but not
through any formal procedure; instead the agency's informal understanding was at issue." Without pausing to explore the Step
Zero question, the Court deferred to the agency and upheld its interpretation.'
Does Young suggest that all agency interpretations of law should
receive Chevron deference? If the underlying theory involves implicit (and fictional) delegation, the real question is when Congress
should be understood to have delegated law-interpreting power to
an agency. The broadest imaginable answer would be simple:
Whenever an agency makes an interpretationof law, that interpretation falls under the Chevron framework. This answer would eliminate Step Zero altogether. But everyone should be willing to agree
that the answer is too broad. Suppose, for example, that an agency
interprets the APA. Is the Food and Drug Administration
476 U.S. 974 (1986).
99
21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000).
" Young, 476 U.S. at 976-77.
...
Id. at 980-81. For cases applying the Chevron framework without pausing over
the Step Zero question, see NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
647-52 (1990); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1989); FDIC v. Phila. Gear
Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438-439 (1986).
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("FDA") permitted to interpret the APA's provisions governing
reviewability, and hence to decide, within the bounds of reasonableness, whether its own decisions are reviewable? Is the National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") understanding of the APA's
substantial evidence test controlling, or does the Court interpret
that test on its own?
The clear answer to such questions is that Chevron is inapplicable.1" The reason is that neither the FDA nor the NLRB "administers" the APA; it is more accurate to say that the agencies are governed, or administered, by the APA. Hence, there is no reason to
defer. By itself, this conclusion resolves a number of questions
about Chevron Step Zero. Agencies are not given Chevron deference when they are interpreting the Freedom of Information Act,
the National Environmental Policy Act, and other statutes that cut
across a wide range of agencies.1 3
If this analysis is right, then the broadest plausible reading of
Chevron would be this: Whenever an agency makes an interpretation of a statute that it administers,that interpretationfalls under the
Chevron framework. But a moment's reflection should reveal that
this interpretation remains implausibly broad. Suppose that a particular statute contains provisions governing the reviewability of
agency action, as the CAA does. Is the EPA permitted to interpret
those provisions, because the EPA administers the CAA? It would
make little sense to suppose that Congress has delegated to the
EPA the power to say whether its own decisions are reviewable,
even if the EPA is in charge of the CAA.l" To be sure, judgments
about reviewability might well call for both expertise and accountability; if an agency resists judicial review, it may do so for good
reasons. But when an agency's self-interest is so conspicuously at

" See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 893.

103 Id.

...
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-88
(2000) (resolving standing issue without deferring to agency's view); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1482-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same). But see Penobscot
Air Servs., Ltd. v. FAA, 164 F.3d 713, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1999) (deferring to FAA regulations involving procedures for responding to complaints against the agency); Chem.
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (deferring to EPA
regulations defining "public hearing" for purposes of agency-assessed civil penalties).
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stake, Congress should not be taken to have implicitly delegated
law-interpreting power to the agency."
An unfortunate feature of this view is that it complicates the
Chevron framework. But it is not all that complicated to offer an
amended understanding of Chevron's reach: Whenever an agency
makes an interpretation of a statute that it administers, that interpretation falls under the Chevron framework, unless the agency's selfinterest is so conspicuously at stake that it is implausible to infer a
congressional delegation of law-interpreting power. An evident
problem with this attractive reading is that it does not specify what
constitutes an "agency" interpretation. Does a lower-level official
count as the "agency"? The General Counsel's office? Such questions lead to an amended reading that is both plausible and broad,
one favored by Justice Scalia: Whenever an agency makes an authoritativeinterpretationof a statute that it administers,that interpretation falls under the Chevron framework, unless the agency's selfinterest is so conspicuously at stake that it is implausible to infer a
congressional delegation of law-interpreting power. On this approach, it is necessary only to know whether the purported interpreters authoritatively speak for the agency itself. If they do, the
Chevron framework applies.
This approach retains a separate Step Zero inquiry, but it has the
virtue of relative simplicity. Is its breadth justified by the theory of
implicit delegation? If so, it is because the very creation of administrative agencies, and the grant of authority to them, implicitly carries with it a degree of interpretive power. But on its face, that
statement requires an immediate qualification. Some agencies enforce the law; more particularly, some enforce the criminal law. Is
it plausible to say that when criminal statutes are ambiguous, the
Department of Justice is permitted to construe them as it sees fit?
That would be a preposterous conclusion. Such deference would
ensure the combination of prosecutorial power and adjudicatory
power in a way that would violate established traditions and
threaten liberty itself."° Congress should not be understood to have
"See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest,
13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 203, 206-07 (2004).
"6 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177-78 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment). Note as well that the rule of lenity ensures that ambiguities in criminal
statutes are construed favorably to defendants; Chevron deference to criminal prose-
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violated these traditions merely by authorizing enforcement of the
criminal law; the grant of prosecutorial power, under federal criminal law, should not be seen as including interpretive power as well.
But this qualification, important as it is, is a limited one; it does
not greatly undermine the reading of Chevron offered immediately
above. Note, however, that the resulting reading downplays two
features of Chevron itself: (1) Chevron involved notice-andcomment rulemaking, a procedure that is designed to ensure a degree of public transparency, responsiveness, and reason-giving; and
(2) it involved agency judgments that had the force of law, in the
sense that EPA rules are binding on private parties. Chevron did
not say whether these features of the case were relevant to the
question of deference. In an old but important case, Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., involving an agency interpretation lacking the force of
law, the Court made clear that such an interpretation would have
only persuasive authority, and hence that the statutory question
would be resolved judicially rather than administratively.1 7" Thus
the Skidmore decision suggested that courts would merely consult
such agency interpretations, considering whether they were longstanding, consistent, and well-reasoned.'" The status of the
Skidmore holding was put in doubt by Chevron.
In three cases-a Step Zero trilogy-the Court has attempted to
sort out the applicability of the Chevron framework.
B. A Step Zero Trilogy
1. Christensen
The initial decision was Christensen v. Harris County.1" At issue
there was the validity of an opinion letter from the Acting Administration of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The letter involved the complex rules governing "compensatory time," that is, overtime work paid at a rate of one and a half
hours for each hour worked. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the

cutors would override that long-established principle. For a contrary view, supporting
deference to Department of Justice interpretations of statutes, see Dan M. Kahan, Is
Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 489-506 (1996).
'0'323
U.S. 134 (1944).
,0' Id. at 140.
109529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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Court concluded that Chevron deference was inapplicable to the
Acting Administrator's opinion letter. Speaking in broad terms,
the Court said that "[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.""' The Court distinguished opinion letters and their analogues from interpretations
"arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking..... Opinion letters would be treated in the
same way as the Administrator's opinion in Skidmore-as having
merely persuasive authority. In so ruling, the Court made it clear
that Skidmore had survived Chevron.
Nonetheless, the Court's analysis left several ambiguities. By
pointing first to the "force of law," and second to the processes that
produce agency interpretations, the Court did not specify which of
these two factors was critical to its ruling, nor did it explain the relationship between them. And the Court did not say whether interpretations that lack the force of law, or that do not emerge from
relatively formal procedures, are always to be assessed under
Skidmore. Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that Step Zero involves an independent inquiry, one that will sometimes be resolved
against the application of the Chevron framework. Henceforth
there would be two sets of deference doctrines, one based on
Chevron, the other on Skidmore.
Justice Scalia wrote separately, building directly on his 1989 article to argue that Skidmore "is an anachronism.""' 2 All that mattered, in his view, was whether the position at issue "represents the
authoritative view of the Department of Labor.""' It no longer was
relevant whether the agency's interpretation stemmed from formal
procedures or otherwise. Indeed, Justice Scalia contended that
Chevron deference should follow from the mere fact that the Solicitor General filed a brief in the case, cosigned by the Solicitor of

1

0 Id. at 587.

111Id.
112 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
"' Id. at 591. For a valuable suggestion that the applicability of Chevron should turn
on whether a high-level agency official has endorsed the interpretation in question,
see Barron & Kagan, supra note 24, at 234-57.
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Labor, stating that the opinion letter reflected the position of the
Secretary of Labor."'
Evidently aware of the broader implications, Justice Breyer
wrote separately as well, building directly on his 1986 article to
emphasize that in crucial respects, "Chevron made no relevant
change" in longstanding law.' 5 For Justice Breyer, Chevron's only
contribution-in his view a modest one-was to identify a particular reason for "deferring to certain agency determinations, namely,
that Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to
make those determinations. 11 6 In some circumstances, he said,
"Chevron-type deference is inapplicable" on this theory, for example because "one has doubt that Congress actually intended to
delegate interpretive authority to the agency."" 7 In such circumstances, the appropriate "lens," as he put it, comes from Skidmore,
not Chevron. This suggestion is best taken as an effort to use his
1986 analysis to domesticate Chevron-to treat it as a synthesis
rather than a revolution.
2. Mead
The second and most elaborately reasoned case in the trilogy is
United States v. Mead Corporation."' The agency action at issue
there was a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs
Service. The Court concluded that the ruling was not entitled to
Chevron deference and that Skidmore provided the proper framework for analysis. The key to the holding is the suggestion that
Chevron applies "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.""' 9 It follows that the clearest cases for Chevron deference involve an exercise of delegated
rulemaking authority. In the Court's understanding, a delegation of
interpretive power "may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116Id.
117Id. at 596-97.
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 226-27.
"'
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rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.""'2 The linchpin for deference is therefore the power
to act with the force of law. Such power follows from the authority
to use formal procedures, but it may also be based on other evidence of what Congress intended.
Closely following Judge Breyer's position in 1986, the Court described longstanding law in this way: "The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position. ' '21
In the Court's view, Chevron merely offered "an additional reason
for judicial deference,"1" based on an implicit congressional delegation of authority. When there has been such a delegation, the
Court must accept any reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous terms.
But how can courts know whether Congress has made an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to an agency? A "very
good indicator of delegation," in the Court's view, is congressional
authorization "to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed."1 When Congress provides "for a relatively formal administrative procedure," one that fosters "fairness and deliberation," it makes sense to assume that "Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law."'"4 In other words, if
agencies have been given power to use relatively formal procedures, and if they have exercised that power, they are entitled to
Chevron deference.
Nonetheless, Chevron deference might also be appropriate
"even when no such administrative formality was required and
none was afforded."'" Thus, the Court in Mead squarely rejected a
possible reading of Christensen:that agency interpretations lacking

0Id. at
at
' Id. at
123
Id.
' 24 Id.at
12 Id. at
121Id.

227.
228 (internal footnotes omitted).
229.
230.
231.
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the force of law, or not preceded by formal procedures, would always be evaluated under Skidmore.
Why, then, was the tariff ruling in Mead not entitled to Chevron
deference? A relevant factor was that formal procedures were not
involved. Another was the sheer volume of similar agency rulings:
nearly fifty customs offices issue tariff classifications, producing
thousands annually. The Court believed that "[a]ny suggestion that
rulings intended to have the force of law are being churned out at a
rate of 10,000 a year at an agency's 46 scattered offices is simply
self-refuting."' 26 Hence, the Court held that such rulings should be
treated like the policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines mentioned in Christensen, and Skidmore, not
Chevron, provided the applicable principles.
In response to what he saw as the Mead majority "breathing new
life into the anachronism of Skidmore,' 2 Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion emphasized a position that by now should be familiar:
Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which operates as a background rule of law against which Congress legislates: Ambiguity means Congress intended agency discretion.
Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency that
is authoritative-that represents the official position of the
agency-must be accepted by the courts if it is reasonable."
Responding to the Court's emphasis on the absence of formal
procedures, he contended that the appropriateness of deference
should depend on authoritativeness rather than formality. In his
view, the principal consequences of Mead would be to produce
"protracted confusion" for litigants and courts and also to create
an artificial incentive to resort to formal procedures."29 In this way,
Justice Scalia objected that Mead would significantly decrease
agency flexibility over time, thereby eliminating a primary advantage of Chevron itself.

'2

Id. at 233.
at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

127Id.

'2 Id. at 257.
"9 Id. at 245-46.
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The Court offered a rebuttal to Justice Scalia, one that sounded
almost identical to Judge Breyer's discussion of Chevron in 1986."
The Court emphasized the "great range" of administrative action
and the variety of procedures under which agency action occurs."'
In light of the immense variety of procedural options that agencies
might use, efforts at simplicity would be obtuse: "If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding
deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary
'
administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized."132
But if
it is simply implausible that Congress intended such a broad
range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none
at all, then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action
must be taken into account .... The Court's choice has been to
tailor deference to variety.'
Thus the Court squarely rejected Justice Scalia's plea for simplicity
in favor of a more complex, indeed rule-free inquiry into the Step
Zero question.
3. Barnhart: Justice Breyer's Triumph
Whereas Christensen suggested a clean line between Chevron
cases and Skidmore cases, turning on the "force of law" test, Mead
suggests that Congress might, under unidentified circumstances, be
best read to call for deference even when an agency is not using
formal procedures and that agency's actions lack the force of law.
This qualification turned out to be central in the third case in the
Step Zero trilogy, Barnhart v. Walton.' Not surprisingly, the
Court's opinion was written by Justice Breyer.
At issue in Barnhartwas a Social Security Administration regulation specifying that a claimant for disability benefits did not have
"3See Barron & Kagan, supra note 24, at 226 (suggesting that "Mead naturally
lends itself to interpretation as a classic ad hoc balancing decision, and so a partial reversion to the doctrine of judicial review that prevailed before Chevron").
' United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
132
Id.
3
13 Id.
134535

U.S. 212 (2002).
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an "impairment" unless he was facing a problem expected to last at
least twelve months. This twelve-month rule had been adopted after notice-and-comment procedures, but the Court acknowledged
that the agency had initially reached its interpretation through less
formal means. In a crucial passage, the Court said that the use of
those means did not preclude Chevron deference."' On the contrary, the Court read Mead to say that Chevron deference would
depend on "the interpretive method used and the nature of the
question at issue.' 3 6 In the key sentence, Justice Breyer wrote for
the Court:
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency
interpretation here at issue.137
This sentence represents an extraordinary personal triumph for
Justice Breyer. Sixteen years earlier, he had argued against a
strong reading of Chevron and contended that a case-by-case inquiry would be far better than a simple deference rule. Barnhart
calls for just such an inquiry. Just as Judge Breyer urged in 1986,
whether an agency's decision is "interstitial" has now become
highly relevant to the question of deference. Barnhartadded that
careful consideration over a long period of time-a factor that
might have become an anachronism after Chevron, as Justice
Scalia urged in 1989-also bears on whether Chevron provides "the
appropriate legal lens."
Barnhart'sinfluence is already substantial, as a number of lower
courts have given Chevron deference to agency interpretations that
are not a product of any kind of formal process. 38' Thus, under
Id. at 221.
136Id. at 222.
137
Id.
13

...
See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(according Chevron deference to an FDA "decision letter"); Davis v. EPA, 336 F.3d
965, 972-75 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (according Chevron deference to an informal EPA
adjudicatory process and reasoning that "[t]he fact that the EPA reached its interpretation through means less formal than notice and comment rulemaking, however,
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Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart,the real question is Congress's
(implied) instructions in the particularstatutory scheme. The grant
of authority to act with the force of law is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a court to find that Congress has granted an
agency the power to interpret ambiguous statutory terms.'39
Justice Breyer's triumph is not unqualified." Recall that in 1986,
he urged that Chevron should be taken not to establish a presumption or a rule, but instead to invite a case-by-case inquiry into
whether the relevant legal question should be resolved administratively or judicially. In the Step Zero trilogy, the Court has not accepted this position. When an agency's decision has the force of
law, or results from some kind of formal process, Chevron applies
with full force; these are rules, rather than standards, for application of Chevron.'41 Notably, Justice Breyer has urged that even
when formal rulemaking is involved, and hence the agency's decision has the force of law, an agency might not receive Chevron
deference "because Congress may have intended not to leave the
matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency, irrespective
of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that interpretation,
' But as
say, where an unusually basic legal question is at issue."142
Justice Scalia notes, the Court has yet to adopt this approach. 43
And when Chevron applies, the Step Zero trilogy does not suggest
that courts ought to engage in any kind of case-by-case inquiry. Of
does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise
due").
...
But see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2712-13 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that formal rulemaking authority is neither necessary nor sufficient). It was under this rationale that the Court
in Gonzales concluded that the Attorney General lacked authority to prohibit physician-assisted suicide: Carefully parsing the relevant statutes, the. Court ruled that his
interpretations were merely entitled to Skidmore deference under Step Zero. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 924-25 (2006).
40See Barron & Kagan, supra note 24, at 227 (emphasizing the degree of structure
imposed by the Mead opinion).
1 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 328-29
(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27) (granting Chevron deference to
EPA regulations promulgated pursuant to Congressional authorization "to make
rules carrying the force of law"); Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2003) (granting Chevron deference to DOJ regulations that were promulgated
"using conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures").
142Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2713 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 2719 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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course, it would be possible to use the trilogy as the foundation for
a far more frontal assault on the Chevron framework-to suggest
that whether an issue is interstitial, or calls for agency expertise,
always bears on the deference question, and not merely on the
threshold inquiry as to whether Chevron is applicable at all. As we
shall soon see, a second Step One trilogy moves in this direction,
and hence some of the Court's decisions can be taken to suggest a
tacit judgment to exactly that effect.1 " And in an important opinion, Judge Posner appeared to endorse such a reading when he
wrote that Barnhart "suggests a merger between Chevron deference and Skidmore's ... approach of varying the deference that
'
agency decisions receive in accordance with the circumstances."145
If indeed there has been a "merger," meaning that courts would
always engage in multifactor analysis in deciding whether to apply
Chevron, Justice Breyer's triumph is complete. But notwithstanding Judge Posner's suggestion, the formal doctrine does not qualify
the Chevron framework in this way-with one exception to which I
will turn in due course.
C. The Trilogy In the Lower Courts
As might be expected, the Step Zero trilogy has produced a
great deal of complexity in lower court rulings"-strikingly, in a
series of decisions according Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not follow formal procedures.
144
See,

e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60
(2000) (citing then-Judge Breyer's article and arguing that "there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended" to grant the agency "jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 70304, 708 (1995) (citing the agency expertise required for administration and enforcement of the ESA as support for the application of Chevron and upholding the EPA's
interpretation); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231-32, 234
(1994) (finding that it is "highly unlikely" that Congress would have granted the
agency power to decide such broad, non-interstitial issues for itself). Recall also Justice Breyer's suggestion that Chevron deference is not appropriate for questions that
are "unusually basic." Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. at 2713 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
45
Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002). Notably, Judge
Easterbrook wrote separately on this point, supporting the standard view that there
was no such merger. Id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment).
" See generally Bressman, supra note 14, for a valuable treatment.
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As a leading example, consider Davis v. EPA.147 At issue was the
EPA's denial of a request by California for a waiver of the oxygen
level requirement under the federal reformulated gas program.
The relevant provision allowed a waiver "upon a determination by
the Administrator that compliance" with the oxygen requirement
"would prevent or interfere with the attainment by the area" of the
air quality required by national ambient air quality standards.'
The EPA interpreted this provision to require that a state "clearly
demonstrate" the impact of a waiver on attainment of national
standards, and the Ninth Circuit panel treated this interpretation as
posing a Chevron question.15° The court acknowledged that the
agency's interpretation was not a product of any formal procedure,
and it did not investigate the question whether that interpretation
had the force of law.' Quoting Barnhart,it said that "the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue" called for
application of Chevron even though the denial of the waiver was
merely "informal" action.'
The same approach was followed in Mylan Laboratories,Inc. v.
Thompson.1"3 The legal question required a judgment about when
Mylan Laboratories would be permitted to market a generic version of a chronic pain treatment for which other companies had
been given a temporary period of exclusive marketing. In a letter
to the interested parties, the FDA interpreted the governing statute to forbid Mylan from marketing its generic version at the stage
Mylan preferred." Under Mead, it would certainly have been reasonable to hold that interpretive letters of this kind must be analyzed under Skidmore rather than Chevron. Mylan urged as much,
but the D.C. Circuit panel disagreed. Emphasizing Barnhart and
Mead, the court stressed that this was a complex statutory regime
and that the FDA's expertise was relevant to its interpretation. "
The court added, "the FDA's decision made no great legal leap but
147

348 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003).

"'Id. at 777 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(2)(B) (2000)).
at 776; § 7545(k)(2)(B).

145Id.

"' Davis, 348 F.3d at 779-80.
Id. at 779 n.5.
...
52
' Id. (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).
389 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
...
114Id. at 1277.
' Id. at 1279-80.
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relied in large part on its previous determination of the same or
similar issues and on its own regulations."'' 6 Hence Chevron, not
Skidmore, provided the appropriate basis for analysis.

Other cases are in the same vein. ' For example, the majority
view is that Statements of Policy issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development are entitled to Chevron deference, even though such statements are not the result of any kind of
formal procedure.158 But other decisions, reading Mead broadly,
seem to adopt a presumption that a lack of formality implies a lack
of Chevron deference. "9 In the important context of IRS Revenue
Rulings, for example, Chevron deference is denied by analogy to
the tariff classifications at issue in Mead." Many lower courts seem
to choose between Mead and Barnhart,and the result is a kind of
Step Zero chaos.161
D. Bad Fictions:Problems and Puzzles

The initial innovation in the Step Zero trilogy is to emphasize
that agency decisions receive Chevron deference if they are a
product of delegated authority to act with the force of law. It is
presumed that an agency has such authority if it has been granted
156

Id. at 1280.

157See,

e.g., Navajo Nation v. HHS, 285 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2002) (according Chevron

deference to "a mere letter" from the Secretary of HHS denying a request for funds
because Congress "delegated to the Secretary the authority to adjudicate" in such an
informal manner). But cf. Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 961-63 (8th
Cir. 2002) (denying Chevron deference to HUD Statements of Policy but deferring to
them
as "determinative authority" nonetheless).
58
1 See, e.g., Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir.
2002).
159
See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1067-69
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating that if a statutory provision were found ambiguous,
the application of Chevron deference would depend on whether the agency acted with
the force of law, adding that formality is a reliable indicator of such action); Krzalic v.
Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that Chevron deference
can be granted only to "something more formal, more deliberative, than a simple announcement," such as a HUD Policy Statement).
160See Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying
Chevron deference, in light of Christensen and Mead, because "[w]hen promulgating
revenue rulings, the IRS does not invoke its authority to make rules with the force of
law," but nonetheless granting Skidmore deference to the agency action); Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
"' See generally Bressman, supra note 14.
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the power to act through notice-and-comment rulemaking or for-

mal adjudication. But for several reasons, this analysis is quite confusing; the "force of law" test introduces considerable complexity

into the Chevron analysis, and it does so for no sufficient reason.
1. Defining the Force of Law
The Court has not explained what it means by the "force of
law." There seem to be two possible interpretations. First, an

agency decision may have the "force of law" when and because it
receives Chevron deference. On this view, the "force of law" test is
no test at all; it is a circle, not an analytical tool. All of the relevant
work is being done by an inquiry into congressional intentions,
which are typically elicited by an examination of whether the
agency has been given the authority to use certain procedures. Second, an agency decision may be taken to have the "force of law"
when it is binding on private parties in the sense that those who act
in violation of the decision face immediate sanctions.62 On this view,
Chevron deference is inferred from the grant of power to make
decisions that people violate at their peril. Perhaps we could supplement this definition by adding that a decision has the "force of
law" if the agency is legally bound by it as well.' This interpretation has the advantage of avoiding any circularity, and it is for
that reason the most plausible reading of the Court's approach in
Mead.164

62See

Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules

and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 809 (2002) [hereinafter Merrill, Mead
Doctrine] ("The traditional understanding is that agency action has [the force of law]
when it is not open to further challenge and subjects a person who disobeys to some
sanction, disability, or other adverse legal consequence."); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2002). An analogous debate can be found in the
complex body of law raising the question whether certain rules must go through notice-and-comment-procedures; in the relevant cases, some courts refer to a "legal effect" test. See Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). But see Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. Cir.
2000) ("It is well-established that an agency may not escape the notice and comment
requirements... by labeling a major substantive legal addition to a rule a mere interpretation.").
163See FEC v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 254 F.3d 173, 185-86 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
" See Merrill, Mead Doctrine, supra note 162, at 826-30.
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2. Force of Law vs. FormalProcedures
Some rules having the force of law in the latter sense do not, and
need not, go through formal procedures at all; as a statutory matter, formal procedures are emphatically not a necessary condition
for the force of law. The APA itself makes a series of exemptions
from notice-and-comment requirements. For example, an agency
may make rules that are binding, in the sense that they have the
force of law, without notice-and-comment when the rules involve
agency procedure or when there is "good cause" for dispensing
with notice-and-comment processes.165 The Court cannot have
meant to say that such rules are not entitled to Chevron deference;
but the emphasis on formality of procedures seems to leave this
possibility open.
3. Adjudications Without the Force of Law
Many adjudications lack the force of law." The NLRB and the
Federal Trade Commission, for example, issue orders that cannot
be enforced without a judicial proceeding; in fact, the FTC's rules
do not have the force of law. 67 What does the Step Zero trilogy
suggest for agency decisions that follow formal procedures but that
do not lead to immediate sanctions in the event that people violate
them? It would be exceedingly strange to say that the decisions of
the NLRB and the FTC ought not to receive Chevron deference.
Indeed, the Court has held that at least some NLRB decisions are
owed deference,"6 notwithstanding the fact that those decisions do
not have the force of law.
4. Fictions and Heuristics
Most importantly, the relationship among "force of law," formal
procedure, and Chevron deference is confusing. Mead seems to insist on close links among these three moving parts. But what does
any one of these have to do with the other two?
1655

U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2000).

See Merrill & Watts, supra note 162, at 470-71.
Id. at 504-06 & n.180, 511.
'68See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123
'667
16

(1987) ("[W]e have traditionally accorded the Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA .... ").
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In Mead, the Court appears to be using the "force of law" idea as
a heuristic for an implicit delegation-on the theory that when
Congress has given an agency the authority to act with legal force,
it has also given the agency the authority to interpret statutory ambiguities. But what is the basis for this heuristic? It is possible to
imagine a delegation of interpretive authority to an agency that
does not have, or is not exercising, the power to act with the force
of law. It is also possible to imagine a congressional decision to
withhold interpretive authority from an agency that has the power
to act with the force of law. Congress retains ultimate control of
the deference issue, and hence Congress could uncouple, if it
chose, the force of law question from the deference question.
The Court's reasoning might be as follows: We do not know
whether Congress wants courts to defer to agency interpretations
of law; any answer to that question remains a legal fiction. But if
Congress has authorized agencies to act with the force of law, the
best inference is that deference is the national legislature's instruction. At the very least, a grant of authority to act with such force is
a sufficient condition for deference-a basis for a presumption of
the sort that Justice Scalia originally championed. Since we are
speaking of fictions, this particular inference is not implausible, at
least if the power to act with the force of law is taken as a sufficient, even if not necessary, condition for Chevron deference.
What, then, is the relevance of relatively formal procedures?
There are two possibilities. The first possibility is that a heuristic is
at work here as well: An agency will be assumed to have the power
to act with the force of law if it is authorized to engage in formal
procedures. On this view, the Court cannot easily tell whether an
agency can act with the force of law, but an agency is presumed to
be entitled to do so if Congress has granted it the power to engage
in rulemaking or adjudication. This idea does not fit with long-held
understandings of when an agency acts with the force of law, and as
a matter of actual legislative instructions, it is probably wrong.'69
Nonetheless, it is not the worst reconstruction of judicial understandings in the last two decades.'

" See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 19, at 871-72.

170 Id. at 872.
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Alternatively, the Court may not be using a heuristic for the
force of law. It might mean something more straightforward and
appealing, to wit: An agency will be assumed to be entitled to Chevron deference if it is exercising delegated power to make legislative
rules or to issue orders after an adjudication.The general goal is to
ensure that at one stage or another, the legal system contains adequate safeguards against arbitrary, ill-considered, or biased agency
decisions. In fact, this does seem to be a crucial part of Mead,
which therefore might be read in the following way: Any reading of
congressional instructions on the deference question is inevitably
fictive; it is not a matter of finding something actual and concrete.
The best reconstruction of congressional will is that agencies receive Chevron deference if and only if they have availed themselves of procedures that promote what, in the crucial passage, the
Mead Court called "fairness and deliberation""'l-by, for example,
giving people an opportunity to be heard and offering reasoned responses to what people have to say. Of course, trial-type procedures, including both adjudication and formal rulemaking, satisfy
that requirement. The same is true of notice-and-comment rulemaking, which creates an opportunity to participate in agency
processes172 and which operates, in practice, to require agencies to
produce detailed explanation for their decisions. 73 If we emphasize
the phrase "fairness and deliberation," we can see Mead as attempting to carry forward a central theme in administrative law:
developing surrogate safeguards for the protections in the Constitution itself."4
By contrast, informal processes-certainly of the sort that result
in thousands of classifications per year-are unlikely to promote
values of participation and deliberation. On this view, Mead puts
agencies to a salutary choice; it essentially says, "Pay me now or
pay me later." Under Mead, agencies may proceed expeditiously
and informally, in which case they can invoke Skidmore but not
U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).

171533
175

173 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44
(1983).
114See Sunstein, supra note 72, for an overview; for important cases implicitly reflecting this theme, see Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,
378-79 (1998); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 56; Zhen Li Iao v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Chevron, or they may act more formally, in which case Chevron
applies. In either case, the legal system, considered as a whole, will
provide an ample check on agency discretion and the risk that it
will be exercised arbitrarily-in one case, through relatively formal
procedures and in another, through a relatively careful judicial
check on agency interpretations of law.
In my view, these points are the best and most appealing reconstruction of Mead, and they help to account for much of what the
Court has done in the Step Zero trilogy. But it is not at all clear
that this reconstruction is enough to justify what the Court has
been doing-or that it provides an adequate response to Justice
Scalia. The initial problem involves the sheer burdens of judicial
decisions reviewing agency action. Suppose, as is clear, that the
values promoted by Mead come at the price of introducing a significantly more complex system of law.'75 Under Mead, the system
is complex along two dimensions. First, Step Zero is exceedingly
hard for both litigants and courts to handle. Second, courts that use
Skidmore deference are deprived of the simplicity and ease introduced by Chevron."6 This is a particular problem in light of evidence that when Chevron does not apply, judicial ideology ends up
playing a large role in judicial judgments about the legality of
agency interpretations of law.'77 If all this is so, the burdens of
Mead may not be worth incurring. This point is buttressed by the
fact that the choice between Chevron and Skidmore will often be
irrelevant to the resolution of cases. If the outcome under the two
tests is often identical, does it really make sense for courts and litigants to spend a great deal of time obsessing over whether
Skidmore or Chevron governs?
If courts could easily apply the approach suggested by Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart,that method would not be entirely without appeal. Above all, it would ensure that agency interpretations
" See Bressman, supra note 14, at 4-7; Vermeule, supra note 21, at 349.
...
See Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1120-21 (1987) (noting that under Skidmore courts are responsible for interpreting statutes, whereas under Chevron, courts have the simpler task of
determining whether the agency interpretation was reasonable).
177See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3 (showing that on the Supreme Court,
ideological splits between conservative and liberal justices are significantly greater in cases
not applying the Chevron framework than in cases doing so).
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would receive Chevron deference only if they were a product of
procedures that increase the likelihood of reasoned decisionmaking. At the same time, the Court's approach would increase
the incentive to use such procedures-a desirable step if those procedures are in fact helpful. Nevertheless, serious problems would
remain. Suppose that the question is whether to select a judicial or
administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute when formal
procedures have not been used. If policymaking expertise and democratic accountability are relevant, then perhaps Congress should
be understood to have delegated law-interpreting power whether
or not formal procedures are involved.
My attempted explanation of Mead places a great deal of weight
on the value of formal procedures; but this explanation might be
questioned. Barnhart takes Mead to allow Chevron deference in
many contexts in which such procedures are absent; it does not say
when, exactly, such deference will be appropriate, but it clearly
permits deference even in the absence of formality. In addition, as
Justice Scalia has emphasized, it is not obvious that agencies should
generally be encouraged to use more formal procedures, because
such procedures tend to ossify the administrative process and
hence make it more difficult for agencies to implement the law."' It
is also necessary to know how much, exactly, is gained by resorting
to more formal processes. If the notice-and-comment process produces far more sensible and well-reasoned rules, then an asymmetry, in terms of the intensity of judicial review, might well be defensible. But it is not at all clear that notice-and-comment so
increases the quality of rules as to justify this differsignificantly
179
ence.

Mead is evidently motivated by a concern that Chevron deference would ensure an insufficient safeguard against agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures. But Chevron is no blank

,' See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems,
Text, and Cases 316 (5th ed. 2002).
"' See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L.J. 1490, 1492-93
(1992) ("No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment
rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki
theater is to human passions-a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way
the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.").
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check to agencies."0 Step One ensures that agencies will lose if
Congress has clearly forbidden them from acting as they have chosen. Even if no congressional ban is found, Step Two operates as a
safeguard against insufficiently justified interpretations.'81 In any
case, judicial review always remains available for lack of substantial evidence or arbitrariness, and unreasonable agency decisions
will be struck down even if there is no problem under either step of
Chevron.'2
I hope that I have said enough to show that identifiable and legitimate concerns lie behind Mead. But it is reasonable to doubt
whether those concerns justify the high degree of uncertainty that
now accompanies the Step Zero question. Perhaps the Court
should follow the path originally suggested by Christensen and
hold, very simply, that agency interpretations receive Chevron deference only if they have the force of law or (alternatively) follow
formal procedures. This approach would have the virtue of simplifying the line between Chevron cases and Skidmore cases; it would
produce a rule, rather than a standard, for identifying that line.8 It
might lead to an excessively large set of Skidmore cases, but perhaps that is a price worth paying in return for greater simplicity on
the threshold question whether Chevron or Skidmore applies. This
approach, however, seems to be foreclosed by Mead and Barnhart.
E. Out of the Bind
In short, the Court appears to have placed itself and lower courts
into a bind from which extrication is extremely difficult. The Court
seems to have opted for a complex standard over a simple rule in
precisely the circumstances in which a complex standard makes the
least sense: numerous decisions in which little is gained by particularized judgments. These are the settings in which a standard imposes high decisional burdens while also offering little or no gain in
terms of increased accuracy. Because the scope of judicial review
of agency interpretations comes up so often-indeed, because that
"' For evidence, see Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3.
181See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
1
" See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376-77
(1998); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 56-57
(1983); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
"' For an argument in this direction, see Merrill, Mead Doctrine, supra note 162.
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issue is the opening question in a vast array of administrative law
cases-the Step Zero trilogy forces courts to undertake complex
inquiries when it is far from clear that anything at all is gained by
the ultimate conclusion that Skidmore, rather than Chevron, provides the governing standard. What might be done to improve the
situation? I suggest two possible solutions.
1. It Often Won't Matter
The first and simplest solution stems from a recognition that
Chevron and Skidmore are not radically different in practice; in
most cases, either approach will lead to the same result. If the
agency's interpretation runs afoul of congressional instructions or
is unreasonable, the agency will lose even under Chevron. If the
agency's interpretation is not evidently in conflict with congressional instructions, and if it is reasonable, the agency's interpretation will be accepted even under Skidmore. These observations
suggest the easiest path for questions on which Mead and Barnhart
give inadequate guidance: Resolve the case without answering the
question whether it is governed by Chevron or Skidmore. For most
cases, the choice between Chevron and Skidmore is not material,
and hence it is not worthwhile to worry over it.
A number of cases take this pragmatic approach." 4 In General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,"n the Supreme Court was
confronted with the question whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") forbids "reverse age discrimination,"
that is, discrimination against younger workers for the benefit of
older ones. The Court ruled that such discrimination was not forbidden by the ADEA. But to do so, it had to deal with an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulation concluding otherwise. The parties strenuously disputed the (open)
"' See, e.g., Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. FDA, 96 Fed. App'x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Cmty.
Health Ctr. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2002). This strategy is helpfully described as
"Chevron avoidance" in Bressman, supra note 14, at 30. Bressman plausibly objects
that Chevron avoidance leaves the agency uncertain about whether it may make
changes in the future, but in my view, that uncertainty is unlikely to create serious
problems. Even in the face of uncertainty, agencies are likely to make changes if the
argument for those changes is strong. In any case, Skidmore permits agencies to make
changes so long as they have good reasons for doing so.
85540 U.S. 581 (2004).
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question whether the EEOC regulation should be given Chevron
or Skidmore deference. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve
that dispute, announcing, "we neither defer nor settle on any degree of deference because the Commission is clearly wrong."'" In
so saying, the Court followed an earlier decision in which it had refused to resolve the deference question, finding that it was not necessary "to choose between Skidmore and Chevron, or even to defer, because the EEOC was clearly right., 117 Similarly, in Mylan
Laboratories,Inc. v. Thompson, the appellate court noted that "the
result would likely be the same" under Skidmore or Chevron."
The general lesson is plain. If the agency's decision clearly runs
afoul of congressional instructions, or if the agency's decision is
clearly consistent with the statute, the Step Zero question is immaterial.
2. DomesticatingMead
The second and more ambitious solution would attempt to domesticate Mead-and to suggest that, read carefully, the Court's
analysis there is not as different from Justice Scalia's approach as it
appears.'89 Let us turn more specifically to the question of why the
Court refused to give Chevron deference to the tariff classification
letter at issue in Mead. The Court did not rest content with the observation that such letters were not a product of formal processes.
Instead, it said "to claim that classifications have legal force is to
ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to
15,000 of them each year."'" Because of that reality, the "suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at [an agency's] 46 offices is
self-refuting."' 9' If these sentences are emphasized, Mead emerges
as a highly pragmatic case resting on the evident problems with de1

"Id. at 600.
Id. (citing Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002)).

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1280 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
In the same vein, see Barron & Kagan, supra note 24, at 257, emphasizing that
"[bloth the majority and the dissent in Mead refer to the agency's internal decisionmaking structure-and, specifically, to the level of the decision maker; these references count as the single point of commonality between the two warring opinions."
' United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
191Id. at 219.
9
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ferring to the numerous lower-level functionaries who produce
mere letter rulings.1"
Barnhart,granting Chevron deference to an agency decision not
preceded by formal procedures, is an illuminating comparison on
this count. No lower-level functionaries were involved in Barnhart,
nor was there a question of thousands of rulings purporting to receive Chevron deference. Recall Justice Breyer's emphasis in
Barnharton the agency's "interstitial" judgment on a complex issue, calling for specialized expertise. If Mead and Barnhartare distinguished in this way, the line between Justice Scalia's "authoritativeness" test and the Court's apparently case-by-case inquiry is
thinner than it appears. If an agency's decision is authoritative, and
if an interstitial matter is involved, Barnhart suggests that the
agency is likely to receive Chevron deference after all. It emerges
that the real difference between Justice Scalia and the Court will
matter only when an agency makes a decision on a large question
without resorting to formal proceedings.
This point raises independent issues. It recalls the 1980s debate
in another form, for one of Judge Breyer's principal claims in 1986
was that courts, rather than agencies, should resolve "major" questions of law. This debate has returned in a separate Step Zero trilogy involving major questions; I now turn to that trilogy.
III. WINNING

BY LOSING: CHEVRON AND BIG ISSUES

A. Old Debates
1. InterstitialQuestions, Major Questions
Recall that in his 1986 article, Judge Breyer distinguished between interstitial issues and larger ones. He suggested that for larger questions, courts ought not to defer to agency interpretations
of law, because Congress is not best read to have instructed courts
to do so. For questions that do not involve everyday administration, but instead central aspects of the statutory scheme, a degree
of independent review is desirable.'93 Barnhartendorses this claim;
it suggests that "interstitial" judgments will be reviewed under

92See
3

Barron & Kagan, supra note 24, at 238-41.

In the same vein, see Breyer, Active Liberty, supra note 52, at 105-07.
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Chevron, with the clear implication that noninterstitial judgments
will be reviewed more independently."
The most plausible source of the idea that courts should not defer to agencies on larger questions is the implicit delegation principle, accompanied by an understanding of what reasonable legislators would prefer. Judge Breyer appeared to think that Congress
should be understood to want agencies to decide interstitial questions, but to prefer that courts resolve the larger ones, which are
necessary to clarify and stabilize the law. But what is the rationale
for this conclusion? At first glance, there is no reason to think that
the considerations that animate Chevron do not apply to large
questions. Suppose that an agency is deciding whether to adopt an
emissions trading system, rather than command-and-control, in order to reduce air pollution; suppose, too, that this qualifies as a
large question rather than an interstitial one. The agency's expertise is certainly relevant to answering that question. And to the extent that issues of value are involved, it would appear best to permit the resolution of ambiguities to come from a politically
accountable actor rather than the courts. 95
Indeed, the example is a version of Chevron itself. Chevron
hardly involved an interstitial question of the sort at issue in the
everyday administration of the CAA; it involved a significant rethinking of the definition of the statutory term "source." Of course,
we are speaking of legal fictions, but why should it be assumed that
Congress (fictionally) intended the courts, rather than agencies, to
define that term? Isn't that a bad and unhelpful fiction? Judge
Breyer's central response is that "Congress is more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute's
daily administration."" 9 But this argument is unconvincing. If Congress has, in fact, focused upon, and answered, major questions,
agencies must accept those answers under Chevron Step One. By
94

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).

' Note that this particular example is not hypothetical. It lies at the heart of the
looming litigation over the validity of the EPA's recent decision to regulate mercury,
a hazardous pollutant, under a trading system. See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10297,
10306-07 (2004).
' Breyer, supra note 23, at 370.
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hypothesis, we are dealing not with such cases but with those in
which statutes are ambiguous, and the only question is whether to
accept an agency's resolution or instead to rely on the interpretation chosen by a federal court. For "major questions," the agency's
specialized fact-finding competence and democratic accountability
might well be more relevant, not less. With "major questions,"
there is no reason to think that Congress, and reasonable legislators, seek a judicial rather than administrative judgment.
A better justification for the distinction between interstitial and
major questions involves agency incentives. Perhaps there is less
reason to trust agencies when they are making large-scale judgments about statutory meaning. Parochial pressures, such as those
imposed by interest groups, may distort agency decisions in one or
another direction; agency self-interest, such as the expansion of
administrative authority, may also increase the likelihood of bias.
Judge Breyer might be taken to have suggested that on interstitial
questions, involving everyday administration, agencies could be
trusted, but not so when a major decision was involved. And if
agencies are systematically less reliable on major questions, the argument for a reduced degree of deference would be quite plausible.
Nonetheless, that argument faces large problems. As I have
noted, the line between interstitial and major questions is thin, and
it is hardly clear that courts are in a substantially better position to
resolve the "major" questions than are agencies. Perhaps agencies
are responding to parochial pressures, but it is also possible that
their judgments are a product of specialized competence and democratic will. No sustained evidence justifies the suggestion that
when agencies make decisions on major questions, bias and selfinterest are the motivating factors. In any case, Chevron deference
does not give agencies a blank check. It remains the case that
agency decisions must not violate clearly expressed legislative will,
must represent reasonable interpretations of statutes, and must not
be arbitrary in any way.'98 These constraints produce significant
checks on potential agency self-interest and bias.

" In fact, evidence shows that often judicial judgments are based on the judge's own
policies. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3.
'9 See cases cited supra note 182.
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Judge Breyer's challenge to the simple reading of Chevron referred more generally to the psychological difficulty that judges
may have in believing that an agency interpretation is both reasonable and wrong-a difficulty that might well be heightened for major questions. Perhaps he is right. But it is hardly unfamiliar for
judges to think: "wrong, but reasonable." They might believe, for
example, that a jury's verdict is incorrect but not clearly erroneous,
or that some interpretations, even major ones, are hard to defend
but not "irrational." 1 In any case, doctrines of deference ought not
to be based on the psychological difficulties of judges. Perhaps
Judge Breyer's point should be taken as purely predictive-as a
claim that judges are unlikely to follow the simplified version of
Chevron either generally or for major questions in particular. If so,
the path of the law is certainly a point in his favor; indeed, the decisions of the past twenty years suggest that he was uncannily prescient. But he clearly means his point as a normative one-as a
challenge to the simplified reading of Chevron-and to this extent,
the psychological point is irrelevant.2'
2. Jurisdiction
In an early debate, the Court divided on the question whether
Chevron applies to jurisdictional disputes, 211 and this particular Step
Zero question remains unsettled in the lower courts. It is easy to
'" See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
Judge Breyer ought to be taken as venturing a version of "ought implies

200Perhaps

can," through the suggestion that the Supreme Court should not ask judges to maintain a psychologically unrealistic attitude. So stated, the argument is logical, but the
use of lenient standards of review suggests that judges can indeed maintain that attitude.
201 Compare Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354,
380-82 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing in favor of granting deference to
agency interpretations of jurisdictional statutes), with id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference ought not be given to agencies on jurisdictional questions because agencies do not "administer" statutes conferring or confining their jurisdiction).
20
See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.
1999) (refusing to defer to an agency interpretation on jurisdictional issue); Cavert
Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 598, 602-06 (3d Cir. 1996) (deferring on jurisdictional issue involving definition of "employee"); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 704
(9th Cir. 1995) (deferring on jurisdictional issue involving definition of "public
lands"). A recent discussion can be found in NRDC v. Abraham, in which the court,
after finding a Step One violation, adds that "it seems highly unlikely that a responsi-
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understand the opposing views. Chevron rests on a theory of implied delegation, and perhaps Congress should not be taken to
have intended to delegate to agencies the power to decide on the
scope of their own authority. That question, it might be thought,
ought to be answered by an independent institution, not by the
agency itself. Thus Justice Brennan urged that judgments about jurisdiction "have not been entrusted to the agency" and might well
"conflict... with the agency's institutional interests in expanding
its own power., 23 In his view, "agencies can claim no special expertise in interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction," and Conto fill
gress cannot be presumed to have intended the "agency
'gaps' in a statute confining the agency's jurisdiction. ' ' 21
But any exemption of jurisdictional questions is vulnerable on
two grounds. First, the line between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is far from clear; hence any exemption threatens to
introduce more complexity into the world of Chevron. Justice
Scalia argued that "there is no discernible line between an agency's
exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized ap0 5 Second, the theory that underlies
plication of its authority.""
Chevron might well support, rather than undermine, its application
to jurisdictional questions. If an agency is asserting or denying jurisdiction over some area, it is either because democratic forces are
leading it to do so or because its own specialized competence justifies its jurisdictional decision. Justice Scalia urged that "Congress
would naturally expect that the agency would be responsible,
within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its statutory authority or jurisdiction. '' 21 Of course the claim about what "Congress would naturally expect" is a fiction, but perhaps it is the most
useful one.
Consider a prominent example. During the Clinton Administration, the EPA contended that it could assert jurisdiction over

ble Congress would implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of
its own power"-and then suggests that Mead (!) provided the appropriate framework. 355 F.3d 179, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554,
1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
'03 Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
20
6

Id. at 381-82.
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greenhouse gases under ambiguous provisions of the CAA. 27 During the Bush Administration, the EPA contended that it could not
do so."° The difference is undoubtedly attributable to some combination of political commitments and readings of relevant evidence.
If this is so, there is every reason to give deference to the agency's
jurisdictional judgment under Chevron. In the end, there is no sufficient basis for an exception to Chevron when jurisdictional issues
are involved.
B. The Major Question Trilogy
While the Court has not recently spoken to the question of jurisdiction, it has issued three decisions that bear on the Step Zero
question of whether Chevron applies to major questions. The
meaning of these decisions is far from clear, and it remains to be
seen whether they will be taken to carve out a distinct exception to
Chevron. But the Court has given strong indications that this is
what it means to do, in a way that has an unmistakable link with
Judge Breyer's distinction between interstitial and major questions.
Ironically, Justice Breyer dissented from the most important and
explicit of these decisions, which borrowed from and cited his central argument.
1. An "Unlikely" Delegation:MCI
The first case in the Major Question trilogy is MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T.2" The 1934 Communications Act permits
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to "modify"
the statutory requirement that carriers file tariffs and charge customers in accordance with the tariffs that have been filed.21 ° As part

207See

J. Christopher Baird, Note, Trapped in the Greenhouse?: Regulating Carbon

Dioxide after FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 54 Duke L.J. 147, 150
(2004); Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air, But Is the
EPA Correct That It Is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1996, 2000-01
(2004).
2' Baird, supra note 207, at 178; Winters, supra note 207, at 1996; see also Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L. Horinko,
Acting EPA Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2
petitiongcmemo8-28.pdf.
209512 U.S. 218 (1994).
21047 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2000)).
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of a program of partial deregulation, the FCC issued a regulation
providing that only AT&T, as the dominant long-distance carrier,
would have to file tariffs; other carriers were not required to do so.
At first glance, this was a straightforward Step One question,
and by a 6-3 vote, the Court held that the agency's decision was
unlawful under Step One. Much of Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court emphasized the dictionary definition of "modify"-a definition that, in the Court's view, permitted only "moderate" or "modest," rather than fundamental, change."' Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion pointed out, however, that a long-established meaning
of "modify"-"to limit or reduce in extent or degree"-was fully
compatible with the FCC's decision. 2 Perhaps, then, MCI could be
taken as an odd case in which the Court found a Step One violation
because of an emphasis, characteristic in Justice Scalia's opinions,
on what most dictionaries say. Perhaps Justice Scalia's opinion
should be taken as a vindication of his 1989 promise that as an advocate of "plain meaning" approaches to interpretation, he would
be entirely willing to invoke Chevron Step One to strike down
agency action.
But the Court offered a strong clue that something else was involved. It noted that rate filings are "the essential characteristic of
a rate-regulated industry." 1 ' In this light, it "is highly unlikely that
Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion. , 1' Thus, the Court's analysis of whether the agency's decision was a "modification" was undertaken with reference to "the
enormous importance to the statutory scheme of the tariff-filing
provision. 21'5 This discussion, and the suggestion about what "Con-

gress would leave" to the agency, seems to suggest that a kind of
Step Zero inquiry might be involved, one that raised a question
whether Congress intended to delegate this "enormous" question
to a regulatory agency. Indeed, the Court's emphasis on the important, and hardly interstitial, nature of the question at issue might

U.S. at 225.
at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2,3Id. at 231 (majority opinion).
214 Id.
215 Id.
211MCI, 512
212 Id.
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easily be taken as a partial endorsement of Justice Breyer's approach to the Chevron question.
2. Where's Chevron?: "Some Degree of Deference"
The Court provided a related clue in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.216 At issue was a provision of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") that makes it
unlawful to "take" a member of an endangered species. 2 ' The word
"take" is defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct. 2 8 By regulation, the Department of the Interior adopted a
broad understanding of the word "take," interpreting it to include
"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behav' Small
ioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."219
landowners and logging companies challenged this definition as
unlawfully broad.
Two different opinions would have been unsurprising from the
Court. The Court might have upheld the regulation by treating the
case as a simple rerun of Chevron itself, involving an ambiguous
term ("harm") and a reasonable agency interpretation of that term.
Alternatively, the Court might have struck down the regulation
under Chevron Step One on the ground that the term "harm" appears in the context of verbs suggesting intentionality ("harass...
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect").220 The
Court might have held that the context forbids an interpretation
that would include mere habitat modification and unintended injury to members of endangered species. Indeed, Justice Scalia, true
to his account in 1989 and emphasizing dictionaries as he did in
MCI, was willing to find a "plain meaning" of the statute that prohibited the agency's understanding. 21 But the Court took neither of

216515 U.S. 687 (1995).
21716 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)

(1988) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000)).
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000)).
29 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004)).
218 16

22016 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
221Sweet Home, 515 U.S.

at 714, 736 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court might have

invalidated the regulation by reference to some canon of construction, perhaps in-
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these approaches. Instead it embarked on its own independent
construction of the statute, suggesting the correctness of the broad
construction. For most of the Court's opinion, it would be reasonable to ask: Where is Chevron? Why does the Court fail to point to
statutory ambiguity and the agency's interpretation?
After parsing the statute independently, the Court turned to
Chevron in a brief paragraph, noting (finally!) that Congress had
"not unambiguously manifest[ed] its intent" to forbid the regulation.222 The Court then added a singularly odd sentence: "The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together
with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation."2 3 At that point, the Court did
not cite Chevron or indeed any of its other decisions on the general
question. Instead its citation reads, in full: "See Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363,
373 (1986).,,22' As it happens, page 373 of this essay contains the
heart of Judge Breyer's attack on Chevron, on the ground that the
proper judicial attitude toward review of questions
2 5 of law cannot
formula."
verbal
simple
single
any
to
"be reduced
This paragraph in Sweet Home is cryptic, to be sure, but the
Court's opinion might well be read in a way that fits with the general approach in MCI. The scope of the words "take" and "harm"
is not an interstitial question; on the contrary, it goes to the heart
of the ESA. Narrow definitions would constrict the range of the
statutory ban; broad definitions work, in a sense, to expand the
agency's jurisdiction. For this reason, Sweet Home did not present
the sort of minor question, involved in everyday administration,
which Judge Breyer treated as the core case for judicial deference
to agency interpretation. At the same time, however, both expertise and accountability are relevant to interpretation of this provision of the Act, and a judgment about the breadth of the term
"harm" certainly requires knowledge of the underlying facts.
volving the protection of property rights. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion contains an
gesture in that direction. Id. at 714.
opening
222
Id.at 703 (majority opinion).
Id.
223
224
Id.at 703-04.
"5 Breyer, supra note 23, at 373.
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Unlike in MCI, the agency in Sweet Home was not fundamentally
altering any central feature of the statute. Hence "some degree of
deference" was due. But the Court's refusal to produce a simple
Chevron opinion, and its citation to the 1986 essay, appear to endorse Judge Breyer's position on the proper approach.
3. "Congress Could Not Have Intended to Delegate":Brown &
Williamson
It might have been an overreaction to see MCI and Sweet Home
as offering a serious qualification of Chevron, or as suggesting that
major questions would be treated in any special way. But consider
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.226 At issue was
whether the FDA had authority to regulate tobacco and tobacco
products. The agency pointed to the statutory language, which defines drug to include "articles (other than food) intended to affect
22 It would
the structure or any function of the body.""
certainly be
plausible to argue that under this language, and with the assistance
of Chevron, the FDA could assert authority over tobacco. At the
same time, it could have been concluded that the case presented a
question of agency jurisdiction, for which Chevron deference was
inapposite. But the Court took a far more complicated route. Much
of its opinion emphasized the wide range of tobacco-specific legislation enacted by Congress in recent decades-legislation that, in
the Court's view, should "preclude an interpretation of the FDCA
'
that grants the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products."228
This argument had a degree of fragility, as the Court appeared to
appreciate; repeals by implication are disfavored,229 and the Court's
failure to allow the agency to interpret ambiguous terms, merely
because of subsequent legislation, was the equivalent of a finding
of an implied repeal.
Perhaps for this reason, the Court added a closing word. It said
that its inquiry into the Step One question "is shaped, at least in

226529 U.S. 120 (2000).
22721 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)

(1994) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)

(2000)).

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 155.
See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978) (citing Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,549-50 (1974)).
22S

229
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some measure, by the nature of the question presented., 32 ° Chevron, the Court noted, is based on "an implicit delegation," but in
"extraordinary cases" courts should "hesitate before concluding
that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation., 321 Just as
in Sweet Home, the Court cited no case for this key proposition but
instead resorted to only one source: Judge Breyer's 1986 essay. On
this occasion, however, it went beyond the citation to offer a quotation, encapsulating one of Judge Breyer's central arguments, that
there is a difference between "major questions," on which "Con2 32
gress is more likely to have focused," and "interstitial matters.
At that point, the Court drew a direct connection with MCI: "As in
MCI, we are confident that Congress could not have intended to
and political significance to
delegate a decision of such economic
2 33
fashion.
a
cryptic
so
in
an agency
Ironically, Justice Breyer dissented from the Court's conclusion;
even more ironically, he offered a powerful rebuttal to his own argument from 1986. He acknowledged that "one might claim" a
"background canon of interpretation" to the effect that decisions
with enormous social consequences "should be made by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected
agency administrators. ' , 21 In this way, he suggested, even more
clearly than the Court, that some rejections of agency interpretations of statutes might be rooted in nondelegation principles, reflecting a reluctance to take ambiguous provisions as grants of
"enormous" discretion to agencies. In this case, however, he found
any such background principle inapplicable, because the decision
to regulate tobacco is one for which the incumbent administration
"must (and will) take responsibility. 2 5 He reasoned that because
of its high visibility, that decision would inevitably be known to the
public, and officials would be held accountable for it. "Presidents,
just like Members of Congress, are elected by the public. Indeed,
the President and Vice President are the only public officials whom

23 Brown

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.

231
Id.

232Id.
23'Id. at 160.
234Id.
235
Id.

at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the entire Nation elects. ' ' 236 An agency's "decision of this magnitude-one that is important, conspicuous, and controversial" will
inevitably face "the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any
democracy. And such a review will take place whether it is the
Congress or the Executive Branch that makes the relevant decision.""
There is a close link between Justice Breyer's arguments in
Brown & Williamson and the Court's emphasis on procedural protections in Mead. Those safeguards might be seen as a check on
administrative arbitrariness, a check that reduces the need for independent judicial scrutiny of agency interpretations of law. So
too, a high degree of public visibility, ensuring the operation of political safeguards, might be seen as a surrogate for independent judicial scrutiny. I believe that Justice Breyer's confidence in these
safeguards is well-founded and that his argument casts serious
doubt on his own claims to the contrary in 1986. It is that issue to
which I now turn.
C. Major Issues, Expertise, and PoliticalSafeguards
Suppose that Brown & Williamson suggests that Chevron deference is not owed for agency decisions involving questions of great
"economic and political significance." This position would have exceedingly large implications. Return, for example, to an important
and disputed question: Does the EPA have the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA?238 Let us simply stipulate
that the relevant provisions of the Act are ambiguous. Under
Chevron, the EPA would appear to have the power to regulate
greenhouse gases if it chooses to do so. Under Mead and Brown &
Williamson, however, it would be easy to argue that Congress, and
not the EPA, should decide whether the EPA ought to be regulating greenhouse gases. This is a fundamental question about the
reach of federal environmental law. In fact, the EPA's General
Counsel under President Bush has used this argument. 9

236Id.
237Id. at 190-91.

""See generally Baird, supra note 207; Winters, supra note 207.
239See

Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, supra note 208.
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1. Step Zero Again
Is this argument convincing? The answer depends on whether
MCI and Brown & Williamson should be read to establish an independent Step Zero constraint on the application of Chevron, suggesting that certain large or fundamental questions must be resolved judicially rather than administratively. I believe that despite
some of their language, MCI and Brown & Williamson are best regarded as Step One cases, not as Step Zero cases. The reason is
that there is no justification for the conclusion that major questions
should be resolved by courts rather than agencies. In fact, there are
two problems with that conclusion. The first is that, as with the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions, the
difference between interstitial and major questions is extremely
difficult to administer. Even if sensibly administered, it raises
doubts about an array of judicial decisions, including Chevron itself. The second problem is that expertise and accountability, the
linchpins of Chevron's legal fiction, are highly relevant to the
resolution of major questions; it follows that so long as the
governing statute is ambiguous, such questions should be resolved
by agencies, not by courts.
Assume, for example, that the statutes in MCI and Brown &
Williamson were genuinely ambiguous-that the relevant sources
of interpretation could plausibly be read either to support or to
forbid the agency action at issue. If so, the argument for judicial
deference would be exceptionally strong. In MCI, the FCC was deciding fundamental questions about the structure of the telecommunications market-hardly an issue for judicial resolution, and
one for which expertise and accountability are relevant. In Brown
& Williamson, the FDA was taking action against one of the nation's most serious public health problems, in a judgment that had
a high degree of public visibility and required immersion in the
subject at hand. Perhaps Congress could not easily be taken to
delegate the resolution of these questions to the FDA. But would it
really be better to understand Congress to have delegated the resolution of those questions to federal courts, with their own political
inclinations?2" I have referred to the concern that on major questions, interest-group power and agency self-dealing might produce
" See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3.
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a real risk, one that is sufficient to call for a reduced degree of judicial deference. But even if that concern is well-grounded, the standard Chevron framework provides ample constraints on bias and
self-dealing.
2. Chevron vs. Nondelegation
Perhaps MCI and Brown & Williamson should not be understood to say that major questions will be resolved by courts rather
than agencies. Perhaps they should be taken to impose a more
powerful limit on administrative discretion, in the form of a background principle to the effect that in the face of ambiguity, agencies will be denied the power to interpret ambiguous provisions in
a way that would massively alter the preexisting statutory
scheme.24'
On this view, MCI and Brown & Williamson are not Step Zero
decisions at all; they are discretion-denying decisions. They do not
say that courts, rather than agencies, will interpret ambiguities.
They announce, far more ambitiously, that ambiguities will be construed so as to reduce the authority of regulatory agencies. Under
this approach, it does not matter if this principle is described in
terms of Chevron Step Zero or Chevron Step One. Agencies would
not receive deference when they attempt to exercise their authority
in ways that produce large-scale changes in the structure of the
statutory programs that they are administering.
The best justification for this conclusion would rely on an analogy. In some cases, well-established background principles operate
to "trump" Chevron. Agencies are not permitted to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to apply beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States.242 Nor are agencies allowed to interpret ambiguous statutes to apply retroactively. 3 An agency cannot construe an
ambiguous statute so as to raise serious constitutional doubts.2" In
241For a valuable discussion, see John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a
Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223.
242EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
243
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
24 See id.; see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,

172-73 (2001) ("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result. This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach con-
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these and other contexts, courts have insisted on a series of nondelegation canons, which require legislative, rather than merely executive, deliberation on the issue in question. 5 Congress will not
lightly be taken to have delegated to agencies the choice of how to
resolve certain sensitive questions. Perhaps MCI and Brown &
Williamson can be understood to build on these nondelegation
canons to suggest a more general principle: Fundamental alterations in statutory programs, in the form of contractions or expansions, will not be taken to be within agency authority.246
For those who are enthusiastic about the nondelegation doctrine, this background principle will have considerable appeal,
above all because it requires Congress, rather than agencies, to decide critical questions of policy (including, plausibly, the question
whether significant deregulation of communications should occur,
or whether the FDA should be authorized to regulate tobacco
products). But the principle faces three problems. The first is the
uncertain foundations of the argument for the nondelegation doctrine itself.27 As a matter of text and history, the doctrine does not
have a clear constitutional pedigree, and it is controversial, to say
the least, to base a principle of statutory construction on a doctrine
that cannot easily be rooted in the Constitution. The second is the
difficulty of administering the line that the principle would require
courts to maintain. As I have emphasized, the distinction between
major questions and non-major ones lacks a metric. On its facts,
Chevron itself might seem to be wrong, and perhaps Sweet Home
as well, for both cases involved large-scale questions of policy and
stitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority ').
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315
(2000) (analyzing the use of nondelegation canons in recent cases). Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), may depend on a nondelegation canon to the effect that
federal intrusions on state authority must be explicit; but Justice Scalia offers a powerful criticism of this account of the outcome. Id. at 935-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that federalism canons should be limited to constitutional avoidance and preemption, and this case involved neither).
2 Cf. Manning, supra note 241 (discussing and challenging the use of nondelegation
principles as tools of statutory construction in Brown & Williamson).
247See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002) (questioning the existence of the nondelegation doctrine).
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what might be seen as fundamental changes in the existing statutory scheme-yet in both, the Court accorded deference to the
agency's interpretation.
The third and most serious problem is that expertise and accountability are entirely relevant to questions about contraction or
expansion of statutory provisions.2 ' If a nondelegation principle is
meant to prevent agencies from significantly altering statutory programs on their own, in a way that goes beyond the ordinary operation of Step One, it would embed an unhealthy status quo bias into
administrative law. MCI could well be understood as embodying
such a bias, based on the Court's refusal to accept the agency's
modification of the tariff scheme as within statutory bounds. Since
regulatory programs last for decades and operate across significantly changed circumstances, agencies should be taken to have the
discretion to construe ambiguities reasonably, even if their constructions lead to large changes in the statute that they are administering. Indeed, this flexibility is a primary benefit of Chevron itself,
allowing adaptation to new understandings of both facts and values.
But suppose that the nondelegation principle is understood not
to include a general status quo bias, but simply to ban agencies
from expanding their authority, again in a way that goes beyond
the ordinary operation of Step One. If so, then it is a modern version of the old (and discredited) idea that statutes in derogation of
the common law should be narrowly construed."' Brown & Williamson could be understood to reflect that idea insofar as it bans
the FDA from expanding the reach of its governing statute. If so,
the Court should not build on Brown & Williamson. Of course, it is
true that in the modern state, agencies cannot be permitted to act
in violation of statutory limitations. But so long as agencies are
reasonably interpreting statutory ambiguities, they ought to receive
deference under Chevron, at least if their interpretations do not

See generally Manning, supra note 241.
See FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623-25 (1927); FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924). But see Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell
Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
438 (1950) (arguing that rules of statutory interpretation taking the form of presumptions, including the canon that statutes derogating from the common law must be
strictly construed, should be discarded).
2
29
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violate a particular interpretive principle, such as the principles
against extraterritoriality, retroactivity, and serious constitutional
doubts.25°
I conclude that MCI and Brown & Williamson are best read as
Step One decisions. Despite the more general language that I have
explored here, they should not be taken to suggest an additional
aspect of the Step Zero inquiry, refusing to apply the Chevron
framework to major questions. When such questions are involved,
Steps One and Two continue to provide the appropriate framework. There is no sufficient reason for a "major question" exception to Chevron.
CONCLUSION

In 1984, it was not entirely clear whether Chevron was a synthesis of existing law, as the Court appeared to believe at the time,5
or instead a genuine revolution, signaling a new era in the relationship between courts and regulatory agencies. Justice Scalia saw its
revolutionary potential and sought to justify a broad reading of the
decision as well-suited to the realities of modern government,
above all by virtue of its clarity and simplicity. In his 1986 article,
Judge Breyer sought to domesticate the decision and to treat it as a
codification of the best of existing practice, which called for caseby-case inquiries into the fictional instructions of reasonable legislators. The most ambitious readings of Chevron see it as a recognition that resolution of statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of both policy and principle, and as a firm suggestion that
such judgments should be made by administrators rather than
judges. So understood, Chevron is a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial to administrative lawmaking.
For the most part, current disagreements have taken the form of
a dispute over Chevron Step Zero-the inquiry into whether the
Chevron framework applies at all. To a significant extent, Justice
Breyer has succeeded in ensuring case-by-case assessments of
whether Congress intended to delegate law-interpreting power to
agencies. To be sure, those assessments are less case-by-case than
he suggested that they should be in 1986. If the agency action has
250

21

See Sunstein, supra note 44.
See Percival, supra note 2, at 10613.
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the force of law, Chevron applies, and agency decisions that result
from formal procedures are taken to have the force of law.252 Nonetheless, the Christensen-Mead-Barnharttrilogy, creating a Step
Zero inquiry, represents a significant triumph for Justice Breyer's
efforts to domesticate Chevron.
At the same time, Sweet Home, MCI, and Brown & Williamson-the Major Question trilogy-seem to be Step Zero decisions
in Step One guise.253 They are informed, and explicitly so, by a
doubt about whether Congress should generally be taken to have
given agencies the authority to restructure administrative schemes,
either by significantly reducing or significantly expanding their nature and coverage. For this reason, the decisions suggest the possibility of a significant addition to the inquiry under Step Zero, by
which courts deny deference to agency decisions involving major
questions of policy.
These restrictions on the reach of Chevron create a great deal of
complexity, and in a way that disregards the best justifications for
the deference rule. The Court seems to have opted for standards
over rules in precisely the context in which rules make the most
sense: numerous and highly repetitive decisions in which little accuracy is to be gained by a more particularized approach. Since the
scope of review is a threshold issue in nearly every administrative
law case, the rise of sustained controversy over the meaning of
Step Zero introduces needless uncertainty.
I have suggested that courts should handle the Step Zero question either by noticing that the choice between Chevron and
Skidmore usually will not matter, or by applying the ordinary
Chevron framework to most cases, as the Court did in Barnhart.
Just as Mead threatens to domesticate Chevron, future courts can
use Barnhartto domesticate Mead. I have also suggested that MCI
and Brown & Williamson, if rightly decided, are best read as Step
One cases; it follows that future courts should downplay the
Court's unnecessary emphasis on what Congress could not have
meant to delegate. That emphasis threatens to give courts a kind of
2

As I have noted, some agency actions do not have the force of law, even if based

on formal procedures (e.g., the decisions of the NLRB. See supra Section II.D.3.).
"' Cf. Manning, supra note 241 (exploring Brown & Williamson in nondelegation
terms).

HeinOnline -- 92 Va. L. Rev. 248 2006

2006]

Chevron Step Zero

249

interpretive primacy with respect to the very questions for which
the Chevron framework is best suited.
Constraints on administrative discretion, rooted in the rule of
law, remain a central part of administrative law, and indeed serve
to give that subject its basic point. But those constraints can and
should be supplied not through Step Zero but through other
means, above all through an emphasis on the limitations recognized in Chevron itself. Sometimes legal epicycles are necessary to
ensure against the arbitrariness introduced by inflexible rules. In
this context, however, the extraordinary complexity introduced by
the emerging law of Step Zero serves no useful purpose.
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